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ABSTRACT
Implicit Theories of Intelligence and Learning a Novel Mathematics Task
By
Nathan O. Rudig
Dr. Mark H. Ashcraft, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The social-cognitive model of motivation states that students adopt a theory of the nature
of intelligence that guides their goals in academia and their responses to academic
setbacks. Students who believe intelligence is an unchanging entity within them are more
likely to adopt goals to display high ability, hide low ability, and respond helplessly to
failed schoolwork. Conversely, a student who believes intelligence is a measure of effort
and persistence will be motivated to gather knowledge and acquire new skills. The
current study investigated the role theories of intelligence play in the field of mathematics
understanding. In two experiments, participants either taught themselves or were
explicitly taught how to solve a novel math task. It was hypothesized that participants
who believe intelligence is a malleable trait (i.e., based on effort) would engage more in
teaching themselves the correct solution and experience fewer attitude-related cognitive
disruptions during a test of the new math procedure. However, attitudes from the socialcognitive model of motivation were only found to influence behavior and test
performance when analyses also included the influence of an effect similar to a
stereotype threat among female participants. Although not all hypotheses and goals of the
thesis were confirmed, results could help develop research that explains the cognitive
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mechanisms of mathematics anxiety and threats to stereotype within the field of
mathematics cognition.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Mainstream cognitive psychology has been hesitant to turn to factors affecting
performance that can best be explained by attitudinal or motivational variables. It is a
basic assumption in the laboratory setting that participants will fully engage themselves
in the experimental task. It is also a leap of faith to suggest that this engagement exists
when the same cognitive processes are applied to everyday tasks. Is it reasonable to
assume that people put the same level of motivation into memorizing a list of words for a
research credit as they may apply to memorizing a list of items to purchase at the grocery
store? However if these assumptions of engagement and ecological validity are removed,
what variables can be added that will explain these individual differences, that until
recently have been cast off as inconvenient fluctuations in the data?
The realm of mathematical cognition in recent decades has focused more on the
relevance of affect and motivation and their impact on math performance (Ashcraft &
Rudig, 2012). Recently, math cognition research has revealed consistent effects on
performance from affective factors, such as math anxiety, math self-efficacy, math selfconcept, interest, and threats to stereotype. Each construct on its own does well to predict
performance; however, there lacks an overarching framework to explain the
constellations of positive and negative affect. High-achieving students seem to have the
right combination of attitudes that foster development and learning in mathematics, while
low-achieving students succumb to a host of attitudes that create barriers to mathematical
understanding.
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The aim of this thesis was to establish the social-cognitive model of motivation
(Dweck & Legget, 1988) as an explanation for the mechanisms that affective states, e.g.,
math anxiety and stereotype threat, create in mathematics cognition. Specifically, this
explanation suggests that students’ attributions concerning the nature of abilities in
mathematics predict the manifestation, development, and effects of the constellation of
attitudes towards mathematics. Two experiments tested this framework by examining the
role that the social-cognitive model of motivation has in explaining differences in
learning and performance to a novel mathematics task in a college population.

Social-Cognitive Model of Motivation
The social-cognitive model of motivation is a conceptual framework originally
formulated by Dweck and Legget (1988) to explain the differentiable, yet consistent,
patterns of academic behavior between two types of students. In this model, a student’s
belief about the nature of intelligence and academic ability leads to specific goals in
academia, which in turn elicit precise responses to setbacks in schoolwork and tests. I
will first explain the initial motivation theories that led to Dweck’s formulation, and then
I will further detail the motivational patterns of beliefs, goals, and behaviors in academia.

Background
Much of the research on achievement and motivation in academia began with
Weiner’s (1985) attribution-based theory of motivation. Wiener found consistent trends
in behavior, depending on whether students had internal or external loci of control (see
review in Weiner, 2010). The group of students with the lowest achievement tended to
attribute failures to stable, internal events, like ability or intelligence, and attribute
2

successes to unstable, external events (e.g., good luck). It was as if these students felt
helpless in controlling their academic fate. In contrast, the group of students with the
highest achievement would instead attribute both their successes and failures to unstable,
internal events such as effort and persistence. In this group of students, success and
failure was completely within their control.
Dweck’s (1988) social-cognitive model of motivation builds on Weiner’s (2010)
attribution-based theory of motivation. That is, academic motivation is based on the
attributions of failures and successes, and then incorporating the stability of these causes.
However, the social-cognitive model goes further by linking the attribution to the
subsequent pursuit of academic goals and responses to failures that students face.
Specifically, Dweck took the attribution framework and combined it with her earlier
research on learned helplessness (Dweck, 1975) and a concept known as fear of failure,
in which students with both low and high achievement are paralyzed from fear that a bad
score on a test signifies low personal worth or competence (Beery, 1975). The socialcognitive model integrates academic goals, either performance-judgment goals or
learning-development goals, to strengthen the causal link between attributions and fear of
failure. Simply put, the social-cognitive model states that attributions about success and
failure guide a student to approach academia with the aim of avoiding judgment on
performance, which leads to behaviors such as fear of failure and learned helplessness.
The sections below will reinforce the connectivity of these ideas and the strength of the
social-cognitive model to explain both positive and negative academic behaviors.
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Implicit Theories of Intelligence
The implicit theories of intelligence are the foundation of the social-cognitive
model of motivation; they serve as the attribution benchmarks for explaining the
foundations of intelligence, ability, and personal worth (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Legget,
1988). Students fall along a continuum when explaining the nature of intelligence. On
one end, students believe that intelligence is an entity within them that cannot change.
This is also referred to as the fixed or entity belief of intelligence. According to this view,
intelligence is a trait that is decided upon at birth; people may have high abilities in one
area and low abilities in another, and there is nothing they can do to change that (Dweck,
1999; Dweck & Legget, 1988). Tests of intelligence and abilities become measures of
stable internal qualities of the individual. A test of mathematics is not a test of current
conceptual understanding, but of innate mathematical talent. When following this
philosophy, the life pursuit then becomes to find those areas in life that they were born to
succeed in and avoid the ones where they would ultimately fail. For example, some
students may believe that they have a natural talent for art, were not born to understand
mathematics and science, and would not consider mathematics or science for possible
careers.
On the other side of the continuum, intelligence is no longer an indication of
competence, but of current understanding and effort. Students on this end of the spectrum
believe intelligence to be malleable and something that can change by building
knowledge or increasing effort (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Legget, 1988). This view is
referred to as the incremental or malleable belief of intelligence. Students with a
malleable belief will interpret a high score on a test to mean that they have acquired the
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proper knowledge base and had put forth an acceptable amount of effort. Therefore, low
test scores suggest a lack of knowledge and a lack of the effort necessary to succeed.
Relating this attitude back to theories of attribution, students with incremental beliefs
attribute internal, unstable causes to academia, causes that are personally controllable.
These ideas were illustrated in a study conducted by In Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin,
and Win (1999). In this study, participants self-reported their attitudes about the
changeability of intelligence; that is, they reported the degree to which they supported an
entity or incremental view of intelligence. After this, they were given an exam and
immediately were provided with a fabricated output of their results, indicating low
performance compared to another confederate participant. In a follow-up questionnaire,
the participants provided explanations for their poor performance. Participants that
ascribed to the entity view in the implicit theories scale gave fixed-ability and low
intelligence justifications for their low performance, whereas, incremental theorists
alluded to low effort to explain their poor performance.
Even though students can explicitly state these beliefs in a routine questionnaire,
the theories of intelligence are implicit, because students are unaware of the impact these
beliefs have in driving attitudes and behavior in academia; this idea will be described in
further detail below. Also, entity or incremental theories of intelligence can be implicitly
primed by reading short passages that endorse intelligence and abilities as either fixed or
malleable traits (Burns & Isbell, 2007; Hong, et al., 1999; Murphy & Dweck, 2010).
The mechanism of priming implicit theories of intelligence is effective because
students, whether they have an entity or incremental perspective, view intelligence as a
combination of both effort and ability and not as an all-or-none dichotomy. Mueller and

5

Dweck (1997, as cited in Dweck, 1999) asked college students to fill in values for the
equation, “Intelligence = _____% effort + _____% ability.” Students with an incremental
perspective placed more emphasis on effort, roughly 65%, whereas students with an
entity perspective placed 65% weight on ability. While having an entity view of
intelligence makes students more likely to look to ability and fixed traits for explanations
of intelligence, they may still maintain a view that effort can lead to a small increase in
ability (Ablard & Mills, 1996; Dweck & Legget, 1988; Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck,
1998). Therefore, retraining attribution can temporarily shift the focus for the causes of
intelligence to become either dominated by effort or ability inferences. Despite the
malleability of implicit theories of intelligence, they become stable in grade school and
continue to stabilize onto adulthood (Stipek & Gralinski, 1996; Robins & Pals, 2002).

Performance vs. Learning Goals
The different implicit theories of intelligence lead to contrasting aims, pursuits, or
goals in academia (Dweck & Legget, 1988). Students who believe intelligence is a fixed
trait (i.e. entity perspective) will view schoolwork and testing as displays of performance
and subject to judgment. Those students who believe intelligence is malleable (i.e.
incremental perspective) believe schoolwork and testing is an opportunity for growth,
learning, and development.
Entity students more frequently champion performance goals. Because
intelligence to these students is unchanging, schoolwork and examinations become
permanent reflections of their intellectual competence. Low or high scores on a test will
signify low or high intelligence, respectively. It is important to note, that entity students
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interpret test scores as not just a current assessment, but as an indication of future
capabilities in that academic domain, regardless of effort or instruction.
Recall that theories of intelligence do not account for ability; that is, entity or
incremental students can still have low or high ability. Because of this ability split,
performance goals can be divided further into two levels of achievement motivation,
classified as either avoidance or approach. Students with low self-efficacy (i.e. they
believe in or are aware of their low abilities) will display performance-avoidance goals.
They want to avoid showcasing their unsatisfactory performance and avoid revealing to
themselves or others that they have low intelligence; because to an entity theorist, low
ability reflects as low worth and overall competence. If a student has high self-efficacy,
then they will wish to show off those abilities via a performance-approach goal. Again,
the goal for this group is to show others and themselves their high level of intelligence or
high competence. An entity theorist will likely have performance-approach goals for
those subjects they excel at and simultaneously demonstrate performance-avoidance
goals for subjects for which they are less confident.
Students with incremental theories of intelligence are more likely to have learning
goals in academia. Here, intelligence changes as a reflection of effort and understanding.
Therefore, schoolwork and testing do not represent permanent internal competence of the
individual, only an indication of the effort and use of problem-solving techniques. The
goal then becomes to learn new strategies and develop more knowledge. Self-efficacy in
these students interacts differently with the learning goals than it did in performance
goals for students with an entity belief. Within incremental beliefs, low self-efficacy is a
temporary state that can be changed by learning more; thus, the goal is a learning-
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approach goal. In situations of high self-efficacy, incremental students maintain a
learning-approach goal. They have high self-efficacy because they have put forth effort,
and they recognize that they need to continue with that effort to retain high abilities.
Regardless of ability level, students with incremental attitudes adopt learning-approach
goals in academia.
Bempechat and London (1991) investigated these ideas by introducing fifth and
sixth graders to an ability called “Matrix Ability” where one group was told the ability
was a fixed trait in which some kids have it and others do not (i.e. the fixed ability
group), and another group of students were told that matrix ability could be improved
upon with practice (i.e. the malleable ability group). After receiving poor feedback on a
set of Raven’s Progressive Matrices, students were then given four goal choices in
solving another set of matrices. Three of the choices were performance goals (e.g.,
problems that are easy or make them look smart), and one was a learning goal (i.e.,
problems that they will learn from). Students reading the malleable matrix ability passage
were significantly more likely to choose the learning goal over any of the performance
goals compared to the fixed matrix ability students who overwhelmingly chose
performance goals. Understanding ability as a trait that can change led students to adopt
goals that served to increase those abilities.
A similar study on fifth graders also used Raven’s Progressive Matrices to assess
the connection between theories of intelligence and academic goals. Mueller and Dweck
(1998) had students solve an initial set of problems followed by fabricated positive
feedback. One group of students was praised on their ability for their high performance
(e.g., “you must be smart”), and another group was praised on their effort (e.g., “you
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must have worked hard”). Students were then given the option to pursue different
academic goals. Those praised for their intelligence pursued performance goals,
compared to students praised for their effort who adopted learning goals. Follow-up
experiments found that students praised with intelligence inflated their performance to
peers and preferred a choice to read a report of others’ performance instead of an option
to learn new problem-solving strategies. In contrast, a large majority of the students
praised on effort opted for learning new strategies. Believing ability to be a measure of a
fixed intelligence leads children to pursue goals focused on performance and to adopt
attitudes based on judgment of that ability by others; students viewing ability as a
measure of effort instead looked for opportunities to gain knowledge, increase effort, and
learn new problem-solving strategies.
To complete the 2 x 2 framework for achievement goal and motivation patterns,
there are rare instances of learning-avoidance goals (Elliot, 1999; Elliot & McGregor,
2001). This goal is more relevant to the athletic domain as opposed to a scholastic
domain (Ciani & Sheldon, 2010). The idea is that an incremental theorist will avoid effort
or persistence that could reinforce a bad habit (e.g. the delicate mechanics of a golf
swing). However, this idea seems to have little practicality in schoolwork. It would be
like purposefully avoiding an opportunity to learn a new mathematics technique to find
the roots of a quadratic equation (e.g., the quadratic formula) because it might affect
one’s ability to use an older technique (e.g., completing the square). Because this
construct is rare and nebulous in academia (Baranik, Stanley, Bynum, & Lance, 2010),
the current study did not include learning-avoidance goals in the testing or analysis.
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To summarize thus far the research has demonstrated that students with entity
beliefs of intelligence overwhelmingly adopt goals centered on displays of performance.
Specifically, these students will wish to approach performance judgments to demonstrate
their high ability, or will avoid displays of performance to avoid appearing unintelligent.
Conversely, students who view assessments as a measure of effort and temporary
knowledge will approach school to learn and develop that knowledge, regardless of low
or high ability.

Helpless vs. Mastery
Despite students’ intelligence belief or goals in academia, many will ultimately
face challenges, setbacks, and failures. The nature of education, to challenge students’
knowledge, establishes barriers to progress that even students with high ability must
overcome. Because students have different beliefs about intelligence and different goals,
they will respond differently to these academic failures. Students with entity beliefs of
intelligence feel that failures signify low ability, a trait that cannot be changed, and
therefore they may respond helplessly. In this scenario, they would withdraw effort and
avoid tasks related to the scholastic domain, perhaps retreating to a high self-efficacious
domain (Dweck & Legget, 1988). This type of behavior prevents the student from
adequately gaining knowledge or learning new strategies, which could effectively halt
any academic progress or possibly lead to students switching their college major
(Zuckerman, Gagne, & Nafshi, 2001).
Students that interpret intelligence as a measure of effort and knowledge will
instead be likely to perceive failure as a momentary lack of effort or absence of effective
problem-solving. In this scenario, the behavioral response is then mastery-oriented. These
10

students will double their efforts and persist until they have mastered the material or
learned the proper techniques (Dweck & Legget, 1988). It is clear how this behavioral
response is more advantageous to succeeding in academia than the helpless behaviors. To
overcome failure, a student must learn the knowledge of successful strategies or use
effort and persistence to find a new solution. Both of these behaviors are characteristic of
students with malleable theories of intelligence, learning goals, and mastery-oriented
responses to failure.
To examine these ideas, Licht and Dweck (1984) introduced elementary students
to novel psychology concepts via a booklet divided into five sections each containing
new material. Most sections were easily understood by all students; however, one group
of students read a particular section in an easily understood format, and another group
instead read that section presented in syntactically difficult passages. At the end of the
task, students were given a mastery test of seven questions covering material from only
the easily understood sections. In other words, the questions testing mastery of the
material only came from the sections that were easily read by both groups; students in the
confusing group were not tested on the confusing material.
In the non-confusing group, there were no differences between the entity and
incremental theories of intelligence on the seven-question mastery test. That is, believing
intelligence to be a fixed entity or a malleable trait does not interfere with the mastery of
novel, easily understood concepts. However, in the confusing group, students with entity
theories of intelligence had significantly lower performance than students with an
incremental theory of intelligence; in addition, students with incremental beliefs
displayed the same level of mastery regardless if they had read confusing or non-
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confusing passages. This shows that students who perceive intelligence as a fixed ability
interpret confusing passages as an indication of a low ability that cannot be changed; in
response, they disengage and withdraw effort on subsequent tasks. However, students
with incremental beliefs who are reading confusing passages may still infer a low ability,
but maintain the idea that persistence will change a low ability into mastery, which is
what the results of this experiment demonstrate.
In another study examining these types of responses, Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin,
and Win (1999) found that students within a Hong Kong university who failed a required
English proficiency examination differed in their willingness to enroll in remedial
coursework dependent upon their theory of intelligence. Students with an entity theory of
intelligence were less likely to enroll in remedial coursework; students subscribing to
incremental beliefs were more likely to enroll in remedial classes. Students with entity
theories responded helplessly to failure and did not see the utility in persisting to increase
English proficiency after a display of low ability. In a follow-up study, participants’
theories of intelligence were manipulated by reading a passage from an article espousing
either the fixed or malleable nature of intelligence. After receiving poor feedback on an
intelligence test, participants were given the option to perform a tutorial exercise that
would improve their performance on the next set of trials or an unrelated ability task
while the experimenter prepared the next set of trials. Seventy percent of students who
read the Psychology Today paragraph championing incremental intelligence opted to take
the tutorial exercise compared to only 13% of students who read the entity-priming
paragraph. Students operating on entity theories are more likely to withdraw from a low
ability task, and discount the effectiveness of effort in improving ability. Considering the
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difficult and sometimes confusing concepts found in mathematics instruction, the math
cognition research would expect to find similar effects; entity theorists disengaging from
math instruction because being confused by instruction material indicates low ability.
To summarize the social-cognitive model of motivation (see Dweck & Legget,
1988), students’ goals and behaviors in school begin with implicit theories of intelligence
triggering the pursuit of goals in academia. Entity theories, believing intelligence is fixed,
guide individuals to display instances of high intelligence and hide instances of low
intelligence, referred to as performance goals. Incremental theories, interpreting
intelligence as a measure of effort and knowledge, lead students to continuously improve
upon their understanding and problem-solving techniques, referred to as learning goals.
The model continues, stating that academic goals produce responses to failure and
setbacks within academia. Students who adopt performance goals interpret failures as
indicators of low abilities that cannot be improved upon; therefore, these students
respond helplessly by withdrawing from the task domain and, if possible, retreat to a
higher self-efficacious task. In contrast, students who endorse learning goals attribute
failure to low effort and poor understanding; thus, incremental students respond to failure
by increasing effort and by developing their knowledge about the task. The strength of
social-cognitive model of motivation in explaining the connection among beliefs, goals,
and behavior in academia has been replicated in multiple educational settings (Blackwell,
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Robins & Pals, 2002; Roedel & Schraw, 1995; Stipek &
Gralinski, 1996).
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Social-Cognitive Model of Motivation and Affect
Dweck and Legget (1988) described their social-cognitive model of motivation as
the way “personality variables can translate into dynamic motivational processes to
produce major patterns of cognition, affect, and behavior” (p. 271). So far, the research
on this model has focused mostly on patterns of behavior, largely ignoring the major
patterns of either cognition or affect. Affects such as self-efficacy and interest have been
explored, but only as moderators and mediators linking the motivational variables to
measurements of performance and ability. Only recently has the model been theorized to
explain the origin of affective states such as math anxiety and stereotype threat
(Gunderson, Ramirez, Levine, Beilock, 2012). Once theories of intelligence, academic
goals, and responses to failure are linked to the onset and triggers of anxiety and
stereotype threat, then the experimentally supported online cognitive explanations that
apply to these emotional states can also be applied to the motivational variables.

Mathematics Anxiety
In order for the social-cognitive model of motivation to adequately explain the
mechanism in which attitude affects mathematical ability, it has to account for the body
of literature linking mathematics anxiety to deficits in mathematical performance. For
several decades, math anxiety, fear and apprehensions specific to math-related situations,
has been targeted as the main affective barrier to math instruction. Many studies found
strong connections between the level of math anxiety and the degree of math
performance and math attitudes across childhood, adolescents, and adulthood (see
Hembree, 1990). The connections between math anxiety and math-related phenomena are
almost exclusively negative; the correlations are -.65 for math self-efficacy, -.47 for
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enjoyment of math, -.31 for math achievement, and -.27 with course grades (all of these
correlations are from college population; grades 5-12 are typically stronger). The
relationship is clear; having high math anxiety is detrimental to fostering positive
attitudes and ability in math.
One theory of the strong negative relationship between math anxiety and math
performance purports that the highly math anxious adopt a global avoidance strategy
concerning math. That is, individuals with high math anxiety attempt to avoid the very
thing that makes them anxious; in doing so, they fail to learn effective math problemsolving techniques, fall quickly behind in an intensely vertical (i.e., cumulative) academic
subject, and deny themselves opportunities to reassess their negative math attitudes.
Hembree’s (1990) meta-analysis certainly confirms this. Math anxiety is negatively
correlated with the intent to take math classes, r = -.32, and highly math anxious students
report taking fewer math classes, avoiding mathematically-oriented college majors, and
passing up math-intensive career paths.
Unfortunately for the high math anxious, primary and secondary school curricula
still require extensive math education, and even college instruction involves a minimum
math core requirement. Students are being exposed to the material, and are demonstrating
enough ability to advance their education. The global avoidance explanation is not
sufficient to explain math performance deficits. To address this concern, Ashcraft and
Faust (1994) hypothesized that math anxiety is disrupting cognitive processes and
affecting computational efficiency while performing a math task. Participants were
shown blocks of addition, multiplication, and mixed arithmetic. After separating
participants into groups based on their math anxiety level, Ashcraft and Faust found that
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on simple problems that rely mostly on retrieving answers, there were no performance
differences among the anxiety groups. However, when problems became more difficult
(e.g., involving carrying or borrowing operations that required more working memory
resources), the participants with higher anxiety increased their latencies significantly.
Participants with high anxiety also had a diminished ability to reject false answers on
larger problems only, also indicating disruptions in their ability to efficiently apply welllearned problem-solving techniques because of a reduction in cognitive resources.
Ashcraft and Kirk (2001) followed up this research by directly influencing
working memory resources in a dual-task setting. Participants with different levels of
math anxiety had similar levels of performance on single- and two-digit addition
problems in control or minimal load conditions; yet, when working memory was taxed
with a 6 letter-recall load, the high math anxious participants produced the most errors
when addition problems required more computational processing in the form of a carry
operation. These results support the conclusion that performance deficits in high math
anxiety do not stem from a lack of effective problem solving techniques, but instead from
a disruption in cognitive resources necessary for immediate, on-line computation. In a
similar study, subtraction problems with a borrow operation and the working memory
demands of a letter-recall task caused greater performance deficits in high math anxious
participants compared to those with low anxiety, despite equal performance on nonborrow, low demand problems (Krause, Rudig, & Ashcraft, 2009).
Both global avoidance and local cognitive disruptions do well to explain the
means by which math anxiety disrupts immediate performance and influences the
development of math ability overall. However, there are components of the math anxiety
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and math ability relationship that are not explained well by the current frameworks. For
one, the frameworks do not provide a plausible mechanism for the initial onset of math
anxiety. The global approach suggests some first instance of anxiety, perhaps an
embarrassing blackboard failure in front of the classroom. In contrast, the cognitive
approach indicates that high math anxious students are possibly hindered by innate
working memory inadequacies. There is current research to suggest that math anxiety
begins in young children, primarily girls, when they model these attitudes from their
female teachers and parents (Beilock, Gunderson, Ramirez, & Levine, 2010). However,
there are some concerns with this explanation. First, this hypothesis seems to be
incompatible with either of the previous approaches. Second, it appears to be incomplete
in that it best explains the development of math anxiety in girls but lacks an equally
strong explanation for math anxiety development in boys. The social-cognitive model of
motivation can theoretically account for the development and onset of math anxiety.
Instead of an initial apprehension of math, young children are apprehensive to display an
inferior level of math intelligence that cannot be improved upon through effort.
Therefore, instead of math anxiety, it may be more likely that teachers and parents are
modeling fixed theories of math ability for young girls and boys (Gunderson, Ramirez,
Levine, Beilock, 2012).
The global and local cognitive deficit theories are also insufficient in explaining
how a student can be high math anxious and maintain optimal math performance (i.e.,
retain the effective problem-solving techniques and efficiently utilize cognitive
resources). For example, Lyons and Beilock (2012) found cognitive-control aspects
embedded within some participants with high math anxiety, such that these participants
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can prepare themselves to prevent anxiety from interfering with the cognitive processes
necessary for completing an upcoming math task. The social-cognitive model of
motivation states that a student can still have high ability; therefore, they may persist and
approach a high self-efficacious task (i.e., a task they fell confident in completing).
However, negative cognitions will still exist in the form of performance evaluation and
the fear of possible failure (Beery, 1975). The model would predict that high ability and
high math anxiety are more likely to be a result of entity theories of intelligence and
performance-approach goals in academia. Also, negative thoughts do not need to be
specific to the math task itself, but to the aspect of performance evaluation. Joormann,
Levens, and Gotlib (2011) found evidence that the rumination of any type of emotional
thought during a cognitively intense process may disrupt working memory resources.
Persistent thoughts focused on performance goals and task avoidance, typical of entity
theories of intelligence, may be a stronger indicator of debilitating math performance
than math anxious thoughts in general.
The social-cognitive model of motivation would theorize that math anxiety
manifests from entity theories of intelligence. In this case, students with an entity theory
of intelligence would develop anxiety towards mathematics due to the negative social
implications that failing a math task entails. Then, these implications would persistent in
the form of ruminations that disrupt cognitive resources. These ruminations could consist
of thoughts about negative performance evaluations and fears of failing. However, before
these ideas can be tested, an empirical link must be made associating theories of
intelligence with math anxiety, both in measures of attitude and in the online cognitivedeficits to working memory.

18

Stereotype Threat
Although the experiments in this thesis did not manipulate the construct of
stereotype threat, I will briefly describe its impact on the social-cognitive model of
motivation. Stereotype threat occurs when performance drops due to an experimenter
characterizing a participant’s ethnicity or gender negatively (Ashcraft & Rudig, 2012).
For example, early research on this phenomenon found that mentioning a negative
stereotype that African-American students usually perform worse on intelligence testing
elicited drops in test performance, compared to another group of African-American
students that were not given the negative stereotype (Steele & Aronson, 1995). The threat
can work for practically any ethnic or gender group across a multitude of task domains
(see Wheeler & Petty, 2001).
The cognitive mechanisms creating the drop in performance during a stereotype
threat are similar to the cognitive mechanisms that link high math anxiety to worse
performance, which was described earlier. Beilock, Rydell, and McConnell (2007)
simultaneously manipulated stereotype threat and working memory demands using a
modular arithmetic task. Females that were told that the study was examining why men
are generally better than women at math had significantly lower accuracy than a control
group. This effect was greatest in conditions of higher working memory demand: more
difficult problems, horizontal orientations, and a secondary phonological load. A followup experiment found increased ruminations and negative thoughts during the stereotype
threat. Women reported significantly fewer negative thoughts when the stereotype was
not threatened. These results suggest that administering a negative stereotype elicits
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negative thoughts that compete for verbal working memory resources that are needed to
effectively solve high demand math problems.
There is a method to neutralize the effect of the stereotype threat. Describing the
effect of stereotype threat, before testing, cushioned participants from drops in
performance (Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005). Participants were informed, “negative
stereotypes… have nothing to do with your actual ability to do well on the test” (p. 176).
These instructions are guiding participants to think incrementally about their ability, that
test performance is no longer a measure of ability. This group had similar performance
levels to a control group that was not given a stereotype threat. Another study also found
that teaching malleable beliefs of intelligence significantly reduced the effects of
stereotype threat in a sample of African-American students (Aronson, Fried, & Good,
2002).
If stereotype threat decreases the availability of cognitive resources and getting
participants to think of ability as a malleable trait reduces this effect, then it suggests that
participants that view test performance as measure of effort have fewer cognitive
disruptions. Therefore, viewing test performance as a measure of either one’s own ability
or the intellectual capabilities of a group, an entity belief of intelligence, may be behind
these cognitively disruptive, negative ruminations. In fact, negative thoughts and
ruminations during a stereotype threat were mostly focused on performance goals and
comparing intellectual abilities between the stereotyped and control groups (e.g., math
ability of men compared to women) (Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007). This
formulation would also explain why having higher group-identification would increase
the effect of the stereotype threat (Schmader, 2002); increased identification with the
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stereotyped group would increase the attribution transfer of explaining performance on
personal effort to intellectual capabilities of the group.
As stated earlier, the experiments in this thesis did not directly manipulate or
measure the effects of stereotype threat on entity vs. incremental beliefs of intelligence.
However, the underlying mechanisms and ways to alleviate stereotype threat support a
framework in which the social-cognitive model of motivation explains the connections
among attitudes towards math, online cognitive-deficits during math, performance on a
math task, and math achievement in academia.

Current Experiments
The proposed experiments tested the effectiveness of the social-cognitive model
of motivation in predicting the study habits and math performance of college students
when they are faced with a mathematical challenge. In Experiment 1, participants were
introduced to modular arithmetic, a mathematics task that is unfamiliar to most
undergraduate students. In an initial test, participants judged the bivalence (i.e., true vs.
false) of a set of modular arithmetic statements. The key aspect of the initial test is that
participants were not given the correct solution algorithm. After performance feedback on
the initial test, participants had the option to study additional example modular arithmetic
statements with answers so they could try to learn the correct algorithm and possibly
improve their performance on a final test. The alternative option was to skip the studying
session and continue immediately into the final test.
The main hypothesis of Experiment 1 was that participants who self-report having
an entity theory of intelligence would choose to study less than participants who self
report an incremental theory of intelligence. As hypothesized, participants’ implicit
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theory of intelligence (i.e. the continuum of entity to incremental) would be a stronger
predictor of total study time and the total number of example statements viewed than
participants’ level of math anxiety, math ability, belief about effort, academic goals, or
response to academic failure, although these variables may significantly predict
differences in studying. Because study habits would be different, implicit theories of
intelligence would therefore strongly predict performance on a final testing session. More
time spent studying would translate into participants with an incremental theory of their
math intelligence having lower error rates and faster reaction times than participants with
an entity theory. However, because predicted final test performance differences in
students with separate theories of intelligence would be confounded by different amounts
of studying, these hypotheses were not the focus of Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2, participants were taught the correct solution algorithm from the
onset of the experiment and then given one test at the end, without a study session.
Therefore performance differences on the test would no longer be confounded by
differences in preferences to study. Characteristics of the modular arithmetic statement
were varied, such as statement size, single vs. double-digit subtraction, and statement
difficulty, subtraction with or without a borrow operation. More complex problems
require more working memory resources, which would be reduced for participants with
entity theories of intelligence. It was hypothesized that the largest performance
differences between entity and incremental theorists would occur when statements are
large and contain a borrow operation; slightly smaller when a statement is either large or
contains a borrow operation, and smallest when statements are small and do not contain a
borrow operation. Although studies have found evidence for speed-accuracy trade-offs in
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populations with high math anxiety, the results are often difficult to predict; a reason for
this difficulty may involve interactions of math anxiety and other academic attitudes.
Analyses of speed-accuracy tradeoffs for math anxiety or academic attitudes were purely
exploratory.
Another hypothesis was that in both experiments, participants with entity theories
of intelligence would place greater emphasis on ability and lower emphasis on effort
when asked to complete the word equation, “Math intelligence = _____% effort +
_____% ability.” Participants with high math anxiety, negative beliefs about effort, and
who respond helplessly to academic failures would also place greater emphasis on ability
in the math intelligence equation. Academic goals and math ability would not predict
different emphases on effort or ability; however, math ability may predict a participant’s
ability to generate two values that add to 100%.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods

Participants
Ninety-eight participants were recruited from the UNLV Subject Pool for partial
completion of class credit. Three participants were excluded from analyses due to
previous knowledge with modular arithmetic. Another three participants were removed
because of computer errors and missing data. After exclusions, Experiment 1 consisted of
92 participants of which 48 were male and the mean age was 20.47 (SD = 4.396).

Materials
Participants completed an eighteen-item math demographics questionnaire to
determine their age, gender, academic class, ethnicity, and math history. Items probing
math history include grades and the number of completed courses in high school and
college. The questionnaire also asked if participants have specifically completed algebra,
trigonometry, geometry, calculus, or statistics.
To assess math ability, participants took a pencil-and-paper version of the
arithmetic portion of the Wide Range Achievement Test – 3 (WRAT). The mathematics
assessment is a timed twenty-minute test that contains 40 items. Statements ranged in
difficulty from simple arithmetic to solving for unknowns in linear equations. Participants
were given a point for every correct answer. Scores can range from 0 to 40.

24

The Abbreviated Math Anxiety Scale (AMAS) was used to determine
participants’ degree of math anxiety (Hopko, Mahadevan, Bare, & Hunt, 2003). The nine
item AMAS has a participant rate on a five-point scale from ‘not at all anxious’ to ‘highly
anxious’ the degree of anxiety in math related situations in either academic or natural
settings. High scores on the AMAS characterize high math anxiety. Items rated as ‘not at
all anxious’ are scored with 1 point; items rated as ‘highly anxious’ are scored with 5
points. Scores from the nine items are summed for a total math anxiety score. Scores on
the AMAS can range from 9 to 45.
Participants also completed four measures assessing academic attitudes of the
social-cognitive model of motivation. Each measure examines the major components of
the model: theories of intelligence, goals in academia, beliefs about effort, and
responding to failure. Every item in each measure was rated on a six-point scale (agree
strongly - disagree strongly). Before each measure, the participant was told the general
topic specific to that measure, that there were no right or wrong answers, and that we
were interested in their opinions. Some of the wording was adapted from language
designed for elementary school children into language better suited for a college adult
population. For example, colloquial terms such as “a lot” were changed to “significantly”
or “substantially”.
The first measure determined a participant’s implicit theory of intelligence. The
eight items taken from Dweck (1999) dichotomized a participant into an entity or
incremental theory of intelligence group. Four of the statements corresponded to the
entity viewpoint (e.g., “Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change
very much”). The remaining four items corresponded to incremental theory (e.g., “You
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can always substantially change how intelligent you are.”), and were reverse coded.
Participants received a mean theory of intelligence score for the eight items with the
lower scores (1) representing an entity theory and the higher scores (6) signifying an
incremental theory of intelligence. Participants can be labeled as entity or incremental for
group analyses by splitting scores at the middle of the spectrum (i.e., 3.5) or along a
measure of central tendency (e.g., median).
The second measure, called academic goals, contained three portions with three
items each (Mueller & Dweck, 1998). The first portion determined the degree to which
the participant values performance as a means to demonstrate ability (e.g., “I like school
work best when I can do it perfectly without any mistakes”), known as performanceapproach goals. The second portion determined if participants view academic
performance as a way to avoid demonstrating a lack of ability (e.g., “An important reason
I do my schoolwork is so I won’t embarrass myself”), known as performance-avoidance
goals. The final three items of the scale determined if a participant values schoolwork as
an opportunity for learning (e.g., “I like school work that I’ll learn from even if I make a
lot of mistakes”), known as learning goals. Each item was reverse coded such that higher
scores indicate higher value for the particular goal being tested. Although each subtest is
scored individually, the three subtests together gave an indication of a participant’s
motivation to succeed in academia.
The third measure determined a participant’s beliefs about the effectiveness of
effort in academia (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). The effort beliefs scale
contains nine items, five items are negative and four are positive. Negative items
measured a participant’s belief that effort does not lead to success and is an indicator of
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poor ability (e.g., “If you’re not good at a subject, working hard won’t make you good at
it”). Positive items measured a participant’s attitude that positive outcomes are attributed
to effort (e.g., “The harder you work at something, the better you will be at it.”). Positive
items were reverse coded to create a scale of positive effort beliefs, such that low scores
indicate a negative view of effort and a high score endorses a positive belief.
The fourth measure, created by Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck (2007),
determined how a participant responds to academic failure. By reading a hypothetical
scenario, participants were instructed to imagine that they had unexpectedly failed a quiz
in a class. They were then asked to agree or disagree, using the previous six-point scale,
on four attributions for that failure and five possible strategies in response to the failure.
The four items of the attribution portion of the subtest are helpless oriented (e.g., “I’m
just not good at this subject”). Participants were given a mean attribution score, on which
low scores indicate helpless attributions and high scores indicate to mastery-oriented
attributions failure. The five items of the strategies portion of the subtest include two
items supporting positive strategies (e.g., “I would spend more time studying for tests”)
and three items endorsing negative responses to failure (e.g., “I would try not to take this
subject again”). Positive items were reverse coded and combined with negative items to
create a mean positive strategies score, such that high scores support responding
positively to an academic failure.

Novel Math Task
Modular Arithmetic was the novel math task in this experiment. Modular
arithmetic is a type of math statement using an algorithm of subtraction and division in a
unique format. This type of math provides theoretical implications in advanced number
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theory and practical applications in encryption and code breaking. This topic is usually
only taught at the highest levels of math education; therefore, few undergraduate students
have been exposed to these types of statements. The modular arithmetic statements, x ≡ y
(mod z), are read as, “x is congruent to y modulo z.” The statements are true if z divides (x
– y) evenly. For example, 15 ≡ 9 (mod 3) is true because 15 – 9 = 6, and 6 is divisible by
3. By simple alterations, a true statement can be transformed into a false statement; for
example, the earlier statement can be made false by changing the third number from a 3
to a 4 (i.e., 15 ≡ 9 (mod 4)). Thus, a verification task on modular arithmetic is effective in
assessing math performance (i.e., reaction times and error rates). Modular arithmetic has
been used in previous research to identify the needs of working memory in mathematics
tasks within conditions of math anxiety, choking under pressure, and stereotype threat
(Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; Krause, Rudig, & Ashcraft,
2010). In these studies, statements with numbers greater than 10 or required a borrow
operation in the subtraction problem placed greater demands on working memory and
therefore decrements in performance (i.e., increases in reaction time and error rates).
Modular arithmetic statements were selected based on three factors. Statements
were evenly divided into true or false, borrow or non-borrow subtraction, and small or
large statement size; statements are considered large when both the minuend and
subtrahend are double digits. Between the two testing phases, there were 90 modular
arithmetic statements. Each participant’s initial testing phase contained the same ten
statements and these statements were evenly divided between true and false. The final
testing phase contained the same eighty statements for each participant, ten statements
from each combination of the three factors. To insure that statements with similar
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numbers or responses were not presented consecutively, statement sets were
counterbalanced in a predetermined random order.
Modular arithmetic statements in the study phase were different from test
statements. Each participant saw the same study statements in the same predetermined
order. The statements were ordered in a way that facilitated learning an effective
procedure for solving modular arithmetic. Statements were shown with their true or false
answers. Successive statements in the study session were altered by one of the digits
slightly, which may or may not have changed the true or false value; therefore, guiding
the participant towards a solution algorithm. Informal pilot testing demonstrated this to
be an effective method.

Procedure
Math demographics, AMAS, academic attitude measures, and the novel math task
were presented using E-Prime 2.0 experimental software (Psychology Software Tools,
Inc., Schneider et al., 2002). Participants completed the informed consent first. The math
demographics questionnaire, the AMAS, the WRAT, the academic attitudes and
motivation measures were presented consecutively and counterbalanced across
participants. However, because the AMAS is a five-point scale and the academic attitude
measures are six-point scales, the WRAT-3 always interceded these two measurements.
Presentation of each of the four measures of the academic attitudes was randomized, as
well as item order within each measure. The novel math task was counterbalanced with
the other block of materials (i.e., either immediately after the informed consent or as the
last task of the experiment).
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The novel math task consisted of three phases: initial test, study session, and a
final test. Participants began with an initial testing phase with feedback that provided the
participant with a benchmark of their ability on the modular arithmetic task. In the study
session, participants were given the opportunity to view example modular arithmetic
statements with answers so that they could learn an effective algorithm. The participants
then applied what they had learned from the study session in a final testing phase.
To begin the novel math task, participants were introduced briefly to the concepts
of modular arithmetic. They were shown the format of each statement, x ≡ y (mod z), and
told that statements are either true or false. Participants were informed that determining
the validity of a statement is computed using simple math processes.
After the introduction, E-prime was used to asked participants if they had been
exposed to modular arithmetic before. If participants answered “no”, then the experiment
continued into the initial testing session. If the participant responded “yes”, a follow up
question asked if they know the process to determine if a statement is true or false.
If a participant responded “no” to the follow up question, then the experiment
continued into the initial testing session. If a participant instead answered “yes”, E-prime
presented them with a text box where they could type in the method for determining the
validity of a modular arithmetic statement. Participants that typed in the correct algorithm
were allowed to finish the experiment; although, their data was removed from analysis.
When the participant was finished typing, they began the initial testing session. An
experimenter was present during this phase, but only to answer questions regarding the
computer response buttons. The experimenters did not give clues, hints, or any indication
to the participants about modular arithmetic and its correct algorithm.
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Instructions for the initial testing phase informed participants to respond true or
false with button presses ‘e’ and ‘i’. Equal emphasis was placed on both speed and
accuracy. There were ten trials in the initial testing phase. Trials began with a 1500 ms
ready prompt, followed by the presentation of the modular arithmetic statement. The
statement was located on the upper portion of the screen, while underneath the statement
was text reading “Please respond True (e) or False (i).” The statement was presented for
twelve seconds or until participants made a response. After a response, the participant
received immediate feedback on that trial. A correct response was followed by a slide
containing a green square with the word “Correct!” typed within. An incorrect response
was followed by a slide containing a red square with the word “Incorrect!” typed within.
The feedback slide was followed by the ready prompt of the next trial. If participants did
not respond within twelve seconds, a screen was presented stating “The modular
arithmetic statement has timed-out. Please make your responses quicker.” for two
seconds. Mean reaction times for solving modular arithmetic are about five seconds with
over ninety percent of the data falling under twelve seconds (Krause, 2009). A limit of
twelve seconds per statement was used to insure that participants remain engaged in the
task. The cap also prohibits participants from spending time to adopt a solution algorithm
during the initial test. Timed-out responses were not given immediate feedback, however
were recorded as an incorrect response in the post-initial test feedback, as described in
the next paragraph.
After completing the tenth trial, the participant was given an indication of their
performance by the number of statements answered correctly, “You have seen 10
statements. You have answered __ correctly.” Participants were then given the option to
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skip or to proceed to the study session, where they could study example modular
arithmetic statements that were provided with answers. These statements were shown one
at a time in a predetermined order. The presentation order allowed participants to infer
the mathematical algorithm that solves a modular arithmetic statement. A screen
informed the participants that they could either study the example statements or continue
to the final test of statements. This screen stated that example statements are designed to
teach them how to solve modular arithmetic statements.
If a participant responded yes, they were shown another screen outlining the study
session procedure. The participants were explicitly instructed to use the example
statements as a guide to determine if a modular arithmetic statement is true or false.
Additional instruction told the participants that at any time they may press ‘y’ to quit
studying and continue to the final testing session. The example statements were shown
one at a time, and participants were unable to go back to view previously seen example
statements. Each example presented the modular arithmetic statement on the upper
portion of the screen with the correct ‘True’ or ‘False’ designation directly underneath
that. On the lower portion of each screen were instructions informing participants to press
the ‘spacebar’ to see the next example or press ‘y’ to quit studying and continue to the
final testing session. At no time were participants making ‘True’ or ‘False’ responses
during the study session.
Although participants were told that they have a maximum of twenty minutes to
study, there were also a maximum of thirty example statements. Participants were not
informed of this maximum. If participants are told that there are thirty example
statements, then they may feel pressured to study each one. When a participant reached
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the time limit or finished studying the last example statement, they were prompted to
press ‘y’ to continue to the final testing session.
When participants were finished with the studying session, they saw a transition
slide before continuing into the final testing session. Instructions reminded them to
respond true or false with equal emphasis on speed and accuracy. Participants were also
told to use what they learned from the example statements to help them solve the modular
arithmetic. The presentation timing of trials in the final testing session was similar to the
initial testing phase. The only difference was that in the final test participants were not
given immediate feedback after a trial response. This was done to prevent any learning
from occurring during this phase.
At the end of second testing session, participants received feedback on the
number of correctly answered statements similar to what they saw after the initial testing
session. After the final test feedback, E-prime prompted the participant to input numerical
values that complete the following equation: Math intelligence = _____% effort +
_____% ability. The experiment concluded with a debriefing explaining the ideas and
hypotheses of the study. The experiment took approximately one hour to complete.

Results

Measures
Participants’ self-report data on the academic attitudes, math anxiety, and math
ability measures were combined across both experiments to create between-subjects
variables for all measures (see Table 1 for means, standard deviations, medians, and
group sizes). Similar to what has been shown in past research, math anxiety was
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correlated negatively with math ability, r = -.173, p < .01 (see Table 2 for all
correlations), with participants that reported lower ratings of math anxiety performing
better on the WRAT. Math anxiety was positively correlated with performance goals, r =
-.143, p < .05. Participants with higher ratings of math anxiety were more likely to adopt
performance goals in academia. Likewise, participants who favored performance goals
recorded lower math ability, r = -.143, p < .05.
Consistent with results of the social-cognitive model of motivation, higher scores
on the implicit theories of intelligence belief (i.e., incremental) were positively correlated
with adopting learning goals in academia, r = .211, positive beliefs about effort r = .369,
and mastery responses to academic failure, r = .332, ps < .01. The strongest correlation
among between subjects factors was between effort beliefs and attributions to failure r =
.505, p < .001. Participants with positive beliefs about effort were significantly more
likely to espouse hard work and doubling one’s effort as appropriate responses to a
scenario of academic failure. Additionally, both attributions to failure and effort beliefs
were strongly correlated with learning goals, r = .318 and r = .505, ps < .001.
For the purposes of factorial analyses of variance, math anxiety was split into
three groups; participants falling below half a standard deviation of the mean were
labeled low math anxious, participants half a standard deviation above the mean are high
math anxious, and participants scoring in between those values are medium math
anxious. Implicit theories of intelligence, effort beliefs, responses to academic failure,
and math ability were divided over the median into incremental and entity, low and high
effort, helpless and mastery-oriented response to failure, and low and high math ability
groups, respectively. In both experiments, less than 10% of participants favored
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performance-avoidance goals. The approach versus avoidance construct was therefore
collapsed into performance goals.

Response Times and Error Rates from the Modular Arithmetic Tests
Response times and error rates were recorded during initial and final tests of
modular arithmetic ability. Response times for incorrect responses were removed from
analyses. As stated earlier, a 12 second cap was included as a precaution against outlying
responses; therefore all responses made within the time limit were deemed acceptable and
no outlier analyses were performed on response time data. Final test trials that timed out
were scored as an error and the response time was removed from analysis.
In Experiment 1, 109 trials timed out. Trials with response times less than 250 ms
were considered as anticipatory; response times and responses from these trials were
removed from analyses; there were 10 of these trials in Experiment 1. In total, data from
less than 1.6% of trials were removed from final test analyses due to timed out or
anticipatory responses. The response times of 11 trials that timed out in the initial test of
Experiment 1 were also removed from analysis.

Initial Test
Recall that in Experiment 1, participants solved an initial test of 10 modular
arithmetic statements without knowledge of the correct procedure. The initial test was
used to give the participants insight into their baseline abilities of this specific
mathematics task. According to binomial distributions for 10 trials with 50% probability
of answering correctly, participants with error rates between 30% and 70% fall within
chance levels, p > .10. Mean response times per trial during the initial test were not
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significantly different among math anxiety groups, theories of intelligence, effort beliefs,
attributions of failure, and math ability, ps > .10. However, participants with learning
goals in academia spent significantly more time responding per statement (M = 4639 ms,
SE = 267 ms) than participants with performance goals (M = 3866 ms, SE = 198 ms),
t(90) = -2.362, p < .02. Participants with learning goals may have been attempting
different solution strategies in an effort to learn the correct algorithm.
On the initial test, differences in error rates among low, medium, and high math
anxiety groups were non-significant, F < 1; and all groups performed at chance levels
(see Table 3 for means and standard errors of response times and error rates for math
anxiety, academic attitudes, and math ability groups on the initial test). Difference in
error rates between incremental and entity participants were non-significant, t < 1, and
both groups performed at chance levels. There was no difference in error rates between
participants with performance or learning goals, t(90) = -1.719, p = .089, and both groups
of participants performed at chance levels. Participants with low effort beliefs had similar
error rates to participants with high effort beliefs, t < 1, and both groups performed at
chance levels. Difference in error rates between helpless oriented and mastery oriented
participants were not significant, t(90) = 1.866, p = .065, and both groups performed at
chance levels. There was no difference in error rates between participants with low math
ability versus those with high math ability, t < 1, and both groups of participants
performed at chance levels. Therefore, all groups performed at chance levels on the initial
test and thus, appeared to be naïve to the correct method in solving modular arithmetic
statements.
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Study Session
Knowing their modular arithmetic abilities from their performance feedback on
the initial test, participants were given the option to self-pace themselves through
example modular arithmetic statements paired with the correct true or false answers. If
participants chose to study, after every example they were given the option to quit
studying and continue on to a final test. Studying behavior was measured using two
dependent variables: the number of statements viewed and the total time spent studying
statements.
The main hypothesis for this experiment stated that differences in academic
attitudes would predict studying behavior. However, analyses confirm that there were no
significant differences in studying behavior among the groups of academic attitudes.
Participants with incremental and entity theories of intelligence studied a similar number
of examples, t < 1, for a similar amount of time, t < 1, (see Table 4 for means and
standard errors of study session behaviors for math anxiety, academic attitude, and math
ability groups). There was a non-significant difference in number of examples studied
and total studying time for participants with performance goals versus learning goals, ps
> .10. Differences between low and high effort beliefs were also non-significant, ps > .10.
Mastery oriented students studied the same number of statements for the same amount of
time as helpless oriented students, ps > .10. Differences among math anxiety groups were
also non-significant; low, medium, and high math anxious participants studied the same
number of statements, F < 1, and studied for the same amount of time, F < 1.
However, there was a significant effect of math ability. Participants with high
math ability studied more statements than participants with low math ability, t(90) = -
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2.820, p < .01. High math ability participants also studied for a longer amount of time,
t(90) = -2.356, p < .025. Further analysis reveals that average time spent per statement
was similar between math ability groups, t < 1; therefore, the significant difference in
total time was a consequence of viewing more examples.
It was originally hypothesized that academic attitudes would lead to differences in
studying behavior and therefore create differences in modular arithmetic ability. This
confound would have impaired the interpretation of performance on the final set of 80
statements. Because studying behavior was similar among the different academic attitude
and anxiety groups, analyses of the final test performance may yield some interesting
results.

Final Test
Before turning to the analyses of the final test, it should be noted that fewer than
one quarter of the participants in Experiment 1 were able to infer the correct solution
algorithm for modular arithmetic. This analysis is discussed in further detail below;
however, it appears that many participants developed heuristics in making true and false
decisions during the final test. This pattern of responses created latency and error rate
data that differed with the standard results found in the literature and also with the final
test performance data in Experiment 2, where participants were explicitly taught the
correct algorithm. The analyses are presented below for the sake of completeness but
should be interpreted cautiously.
Analyses of the final test were conducted using six separate multivariate 2 x 2 x 2
within-subjects ANOVAs for each between-subjects factor: (1) math anxiety, (2) implicit
theories of intelligence, (3) effort beliefs, (4) academic goals, (5) mastery vs. helpless
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responses to failure, and (6) math ability. Within-subjects factors were true versus false
statements, small versus large statements, and statements with or without a borrow
operation. Dependent variables were response times and error rates. All main effects and
interactions not mentioned were insignificant at p > .10.
In all between-subjects analysis there was a significant three-way interaction
among within-subjects variables true/false, statement size, and borrow for the dependent
variable response times, F(1, 89) = 4.881, p < .05. Main effects of all three withinsubjects variables contribute to the interaction in response times. Participants were slower
to solve false statements than true statements, F(1, 89) = 18.853, p < .01 (see Figure 1).
Large statements were solved slower than small statements, F(1, 89) = 12.676, p < .01.
Statements with a borrow operation were solved slower than statements without a
borrow, F(1, 89) = 13.380, p < .01. The main effects were consistent with past research
on problem difficulty; however, details of the interactions revealed the inconsistencies.
Simple effects analyses of the interactions indicate that in false conditions, response
times between small and large statements were not significantly different from each other
for both non-borrow and borrow; for true statements, small statements were significantly
slower than large statements for only the no borrow condition. Subsequently, when
statements were large, response times were significantly faster for non-borrow compared
to borrow conditions in the true condition, yet non-borrow and borrow were not
significantly different in small statements size and true condition nor were they
significantly different for either scenarios in the false condition. Finally, in all statement
size and borrow factorial combinations, false statements were always significantly slower
than true statements; however the greatest disparity occurred for large statements with no

39

borrow operation. Participants were on average 894 ms slower to correctly indicate false
than to recognize the answer with a true response.
There was a significant interaction between true/false and borrow for error rates,
F(1, 89) = 7.018, p < .01 (see Figure 2). Participants made more errors on true statements
than false statements, F(1, 89) = 89.086, p < .01. Inconsistent with past research,
participants made more errors on small statements than large statements, F(1, 89) =
81.798, p < .01; additionally, there was no main effect of borrow on error rates, p > .10.
Analysis of simple effects suggests that participants had significantly higher error rates
for non-borrow over borrow statements only in false statements; for true statements,
differences in error rates between borrow and non-borrow were not significant.
Main effects and interaction involving the between-subjects variables implicit
theories of intelligence, effort beliefs, and responses to failure were not significant, ps >
.05. There was a significant interaction among math anxiety and statement size for error
rates, F(1,89) = 4.568, p < .025 (see Figure 3). Consistent with past research, for small
statements, low math anxious participants had significantly fewer errors than participants
with high math anxiety, both groups were not significantly different than medium math
anxious. Inconsistent with the literature, for large statements, all anxiety groups are
statistically equal in their error rates. Despite the extra processing required, each level of
math anxiety group significantly decreased their errors when answering large statements
instead of small statements.
There was a significant main effect for the between-subjects variable academic
goal for both response times and error rates, F(1, 90) = 5.308, p < .025, and F(1, 90) =

40

8.044, p < .01, respectively. Participants with learning goals spent significantly more time
responding to statements and made fewer errors than participants with performance goals.
A significant interaction was revealed among academic goals and the three
within-subjects variables for the dependent variable error rates F(1, 90) = 4.752, p < .05.
Simple effects show that in the false condition, participants with performance goals
committed significantly more errors than participants with learning goals only during
small statements with no borrow operation. In the true conditions, participants with
learning goals in every combination of statement size and borrow operation made
significantly fewer errors than participants with performance goals.
For the dependent variable response time, there was a significant interaction
among academic goals, true/false, and borrow variables, F(1, 90) = 7.027, p < .01 (see
Figure 4). Simple effects indicate that participants with either type of academic goal
significantly increased their response time from no borrow to borrow statements under
the true condition but remained stable under the false condition. Additionally, in the false
condition, participants with learning goals were slower to solve statements for both
borrow conditions. For true statements, response times were statistically equivalent
among academic goal groups for no borrow and only marginally different when a borrow
operation was present. Consistent with the previous results, response time differences
between false and true conditions were significant within each combination of statement
size and borrow factors.
There was a significant main effect of math ability on error rates, F(1, 90) =
17.128, p < .01. Participants with low math ability produced significantly more errors (M
= .480, SE = .018) than high math ability participants (M = .368, SE = .020). Significant
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two-way interactions were found with math ability and each of the within-subjects
variables in response times, ps < .05 (see Figures 5-7). Low math ability participants
were statistically equivalent in response times when solving statements of true versus
false, small versus large, and non-borrow versus borrow. High math ability participants
were significantly slower to solve statements when they were false, when they were
larger, or when statements had a borrow operation. Participants with high math ability,
having studied more example statements, were able to recognize more difficult
statements and take extra time to insure the accuracy of their response.
Immediately after the final test, participants were asked to reflect upon the
algorithm they used to solve the modular arithmetic statements. For example, one
participant correctly stated, “If the difference of X-Y was divisible by Z the statement is
true.” Responses from other participants were clear indications that they did not learn the
correct algorithm and merely adopted a simple heuristic, “If the numbers had anything in
common” and “I attempted to multiply the numbers, but that did not seem to work. The
experiment was confusing. I am terrible at math.” Analyzing the comments, it was
determined that 22 (23.9%) of the participants were able to infer the correct algorithm
from the study session. Recall that participants were screened beforehand for knowledge
of modular arithmetic, and participants that correctly learned the algorithm had claimed
to not have seen it before. However, independent samples t-test revealed that those who
learned the algorithm made significantly fewer errors (M = .336, SE = .040) during the
initial test than participants that did not learn (M = .463, SE = .021), t(90) = 2.927, p <
.005. Yet, the binomial probability states that 66.4% accuracy is within chance levels for
only 10 trials with 50% probability.
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Participants that learned the algorithm were similar in math anxiety, theories of
intelligence, academic goals, effort beliefs, and responses to failure to participants that
did not, ps > .10. Participants that learned the algorithm scored significantly higher (M =
33.6, SE = 0.79) on the WRAT than participants that either guessed or used a simpler
heuristic (M = 29.0, SE = 0.55), t(90) = -4.248, p < .001. After controlling for math
ability, participants with algorithms were not significantly different than their
counterparts using heuristics in the number of examples studied or time spent studying
during the study session, ps > .10.
It is not surprising that participants with algorithms make fewer errors than
participants with heuristics, F(1,89) = 110.475, p < .001. However, a significant
interaction with true/false indicates that participants with heuristics made significantly
more errors for true statements (M = .669, SE = .022) than false statements (M = .300, SE
= .018); participants with algorithms made statistically equivalent errors for true (M =
.299, SE = .041) and false statements (M = .217, SE = .034). The heuristics that
participants adopted from studying led them to make false responses more consistently,
and therefore perform worse than chance for true statements. Participants with heuristics
responded false on average 68.4% of all trials while participants with algorithms
responded false significantly less at 55.3% of all trials, t(90) = 3.751, p < .001.
Consistent with these findings, an interaction of statement size, borrow, and
figuring out modular arithmetic was found for response times, F(1,89) = 6.414, p < .025.
Participants using algorithms took longer to solve statements than participants using
heuristics, significantly for small-borrow and large-no borrow statements (see Figure 8).
Additionally, when participants use an algorithm, smaller statements are easier to solve
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than large statements; participants with heuristics were marginally slower when solving
smaller statements than larger statements, p = .051.

Recall of Initial Test Performance
After participants received feedback on their performance on the final test, they
were asked to recall their performance on the initial test. They were instructed to type the
number of statements answered correctly. It was predicted that participants with more
negative affect, maladaptive academic attitudes, and low math ability would
underestimate their performance. Only 14% of participants incorrectly recalled their
performance on the initial test. A difference score was created between the recollection of
initial test performance and actual performance. Participants with a negative difference
score underestimated their performance. Analyses determined that there were no
significant differences among math anxiety, academic attitudes, or math ability groups, ps
> .10 (see Table 5 for means and standard errors).

Math Equations
At the end of the modular arithmetic task, participants were asked to complete a
word equation by formulating the contributions that effort and ability play into math
intelligence. Eighteen participants were excluded from these analyses because their totals
did not equal 100%. To examine whether these 18 participants were different than the
other participants, comparisons were conducted. Participants that correctly summed to
100% were not significantly different than participants who did not sum to 100% in math
anxiety, academic attitudes or math ability, ps > .10. Among all participants, there was a
main effect of math equation weightings; participants thought that effort (M = 57.2%, SE
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= 2.15) significantly contributes more to math intelligence than ability (M = 42.8%, SE =
2.15), t(73) = -3.322, p < .01.
There was a significant interaction between math anxiety and the equation
component weightings, F(2,71) = 4.276, p < .019 (see Figure 9). Simple effects revealed
that participants with low math anxiety placed significantly more contribution of effort
into math intelligence and less contribution of ability than high math anxious participants;
the weighting from medium math anxious were not significantly different than either the
low or high math anxious (see Table 6 for means and standard errors). Weights of effort
and ability contributions were only significantly different from each other among low
math anxious participants, F(1, 71) = 18.112, p < .01; effort was significantly greater than
50%; conversely, ability was significantly less than 50%.
In contrast to what was hypothesized, the math intelligence equation and
incremental theory of intelligence interaction was not significant, F(1,72) = 2.380, p =
.127. The same interaction with academic goals was also not significant, F < 1. Similarly,
interactions with effort beliefs were not significant, F(1,72) = 1.322, p = .254. There was
a marginally significant interaction between equation weightings and attribution, F(1,72)
= 3.097, p = .083. Participants with mastery responses to failure placed greater emphasis
on effort in contributing to math intelligence than participants with helpless responses.
Mastery-oriented students’ weightings of effort and ability were significantly different
from each other, F(1,72) = 14.047, p < .01; helpless-oriented students did not place
significantly different weights on effort or ability, F < 1. Participants with different math
abilities placed similar emphasis on effort and ability, F(1,72) = 1.399, p = .241. Despite
the non-significant interactions, it is interesting to note that one-sample t-tests on effort
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weightings reveal that the groups entity theorists, learning goals, high effort beliefs, and
high math ability all placed significantly greater emphasis on effort in contributing to
math intelligence, ps < .01.

Gender and Task Order
Effects related to gender were not originally hypothesized in the proposal.
Differences in male and female math performance are negligible despite differences in
attitudes towards math (Else-Quest, Hyde, & Linn, 2010). However, recent research
found subtle differences in the reporting of math anxiety between males and females in a
college sample dependent on the order of the task and measurement of math anxiety
(Goetz, Bieg, Lüdtke, Pekrun, & Hall, 2013). Females’ assessments of attitudes about
math before testing or learning tasks are significantly greater than their reports of the
same attitudes during or after the task. After a math task, reports on attitudes reflect
experiential information; however, before a math task, self-reports reflect multiple
semantic and conceptual beliefs, which in the case of females likely encompass biases
about females’ inferiority in mathematics (Hartley & Sutton, 2013; Robinson & Clore,
2002). To examine this confound, analyses below involve exploring interactions of
gender and task order with math anxiety, academic attitudes, math ability, and learning
modular arithmetic.
Recall that Experiment 1 consisted of 48 males and 44 females. Task order was
evenly split among the participants; 46 participants completed the attitude and ability
measures before the modular arithmetic task; 46 participants performed the modular
arithmetic task before filling out attitude measures and completing the WRAT. A non-

46

significant chi-square analysis revealed similar distributions of gender by task order in
Experiment 1, p > .10.
Measures
Gender and task order effects were analyzed in separate 2 x 2 between-subjects
ANOVAs for math anxiety, academic attitudes, and math ability. Between-subjects
factors were male or female gender and task-first or measures-first task order. Dependent
measure for math anxiety was total score on the AMAS. Average score per item on the
implicit theories of intelligence, effort beliefs, and attribution to failure scales were used
as dependent variables. Total score on the WRAT was treated as a dependent variable for
math ability.
There was a main effect of gender on math anxiety, F(1, 88) = 7.548, p < .001.
Females reported higher ratings of math anxiety (M = 24.9, SE = 0.94) than males (M =
21.4, SE = 0.90). The gender by task order interaction and the main effect of task order
were not significant, ps > .05. Learning a novel math task had no effect on subsequent
ratings of math anxiety and neither was this effect moderated by gender.
Interactions and main effects of gender or task order were not significant for
implicit theories of intelligence, effort beliefs, and attributions to failure, ps > .05. Chisquare analysis of gender on academic goals was significant, χ2(1, N = 92) = 5.420, p <
.025. Males were more likely to adopt learning goals over performance goals, 28 and 20,
respectively; females were less likely to favor learning goals over performance in
academia, 15 and 29, respectively. Task order had no significant effect on academic
goals, χ2 < 1.
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Gender and task order interacted significantly in measuring math ability, F(1, 88)
= 5.114, p < .05. Simple effects analyses revealed that males and females performed
similarly on the WRAT before engaging in the novel math task, F < 1 (see Figure 10).
After the novel math task, females scored significantly worse than males, F(1, 88) =
9.200, p < .005, and significantly worse than females that took the WRAT before the
task, F(1, 88) = 5.969, p < .025. Additionally, males performed similarly on the WRAT,
regardless of its presentation order, F < 1.
Initial Test
The interaction of gender and task order and the main effects on error rates during
the initial test were non-significant, ps > .10. Additionally, both males and females
performed at chance levels; and task-first and measures-first groups also performed at
chance levels. Interactions and main effects were non-significant for response times as
well, Fs < 1. Males and females entered the experiment naïve to modular arithmetic.
Similarly, completing the measures first did not provide an advantage to understanding
the modular arithmetic task.
Study Session
Previous analyses on studying behavior found significant main effects of math
ability. Total score on the WRAT was added as a covariate to remove the influence of
math ability to subsequent analyses of studying behavior. Gender and task order effects
were analyzed first together in a 2 x 2 between-subjects multivariate ANOVA for time
spent studying and number of example statements viewed. The interaction and main
effects were non-significant, ps > .10. Further analyses of studying behavior explored
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gender and task order effects separately with math anxiety and each of the academic
attitudes.
The interaction of gender and implicit theory of intelligence was significant for
number of example statements studied, F(1, 87) = 4.354, p < .05, and marginally
significant for time spent studying, F(1, 87) = 3.206, p = .077. Among entity theorists,
females studied significantly more statements than males, F(1, 87) = 3.984, p < .05 (see
Figure 11). Incremental theorist males and females studied a similar number of
statements. Among males, incremental theorists studied more statements than entity
theorists; females studied the same regardless of implicit theory of intelligence. The
interaction of total study time was marginally significant because of a crossover effect.
Males with incremental theories and entity theorist females were statistically equivalent
and studied longer than entity theorist males and females with incremental theories,
which were themselves statistically equivalent in study time (see Figure 12). Interactions
and main effects of gender with math anxiety, academic goals, effort beliefs, and
attributions to failure were non-significant, ps > .10 (see Table 7 for means and standard
errors).
There were no significant interactions of task order with math anxiety or any of
the academic attitudes, ps > .10 (see Table 8 for means and standard errors).
Final Test
Gender and task order were added as between-subjects factors in each of the six
previous multivariate 2 x 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVAs. Within-subjects factors
included true versus false statements, small versus large statements, and statements with
or without a borrow operation. Dependent variables were response times and error rates.
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Average ratings on the implicit theories of intelligence measures were first considered as
a covariate because of their interaction with gender during the study session; however,
including the covariate did not significantly change the following statistics. The covariate
was removed to maintain consistency with analyses performed earlier.
There was a significant four way interaction among gender, true/false, statement
size, and borrow for the dependent variable error rates, F(1,90) = 7.600, p < .01. This
interaction was supplemented by a marginally significant interaction between gender and
statement size, F(1,90) = 2.965, p = .089, and a significant main effect of gender, F(1,90)
= 16.295, p < .001. Females (M = .487, SE = .020) committed more errors than males (M
= .378, SE = .019). The main effect of statement size discussed earlier, in which more
errors occurred for small statements, affected the females more than the males. Error
rates for females increased by 11.5% from large to small statements, males increased
error rates by a smaller 7.8% (see Figure 13). The four-way interaction occurred because
females and males were not significantly different in error rates when statements were
false, large, and non-borrow (see Figure 14). In every other instance males outperformed
females; and for true, small, borrow statements specifically there was a 19.5% difference
in error rates between genders (see Figure 15). Additionally, there was only one
occurrence of small and large statements being statistically equivalent, this occurred for
males during true statements with a borrow. Finally, non-borrow and borrow were not
significantly different in all but two instances: false condition and when either males
solved large statements or females solved small statements.
The variables gender, statement size, and borrow created a three-way interaction
in response times, F(1,90) = 5.796, p < .025. Female performance during small
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statements with a borrow was generating the effect. At this point only, female response
time is significantly different than males, small statements are significantly different than
large, and when no borrow is statistically equivalent to a borrow condition (see Figure
16).
Gender was combined with each of the other between-subjects factors in separate
ANOVAs. Only math ability significantly interacted with gender for the dependent
variable error rates, F(1,88) = 8.759, p < .005, (see Figure 17). Simple effects analyses
reveal that high math ability males were significantly more accurate than females,
F(1,88) = 23.942, p < .001, and significantly more accurate than low math ability males,
F(1,88) = 25.518, p < .001. Low and high math ability females did not differ in error
rates, p > .10.
Main effects and interactions of task order with gender, within-subjects factors,
and with attitudes-related between-subjects factors were non-significant, ps > .10.
Participants that correctly typed in the correct modular arithmetic algorithm after
completing the final test were significantly more likely to be male, χ2(1) = 10.183, p <
.001. Given that math ability is related to both gender and learning the algorithm in this
experiment, math ability may be confounding the relationship between gender and
learning the correct solution algorithm. Task order was not significantly related to
discovering the correct solution, χ2(1) = .239, p > .10.
Recall of Initial Test Performance
No gender or task order analyses were conducted due to the high percentage of
participants (86%) that correctly recalled their performance on the initial test.
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Math Equations
The three-way interaction among gender, task order, and equation component
weightings was marginally significant, F(1,70) = 3.180, p = .076. Males that completed
the task first gave significantly different ratings than males who took the measures first,
F(1,70) = 6.870, p < .025, and marginally different than females that completed the task
first, F(1,70) = 3.317, p = .073 (see Figure 18). One-sample t-tests revealed that task-first
males were the only group who placed similar emphasis on ability and effort, t(21) =
0.314, p > .10. Males that completed the measures first and females, regardless of task
order, placed significantly more emphasis on effort, ps < .05.
The same marginal effect was represented by replacing the variable task order
with the between-subjects factor of attribution to failure, F(1,70) = 2.873, p = .095. Males
with helpless responses to failure gave significantly different ratings than males with
mastery responses, F(1,70) = 6.771, p < .025, and significantly different than females
with helpless responses, F(1,70) = 4.435, p < .041. One-sample t-tests revealed that only
helpless-oriented males placed similar emphasis on ability and effort, t(11) = 1.096, p >
.10 (see Figure 19). Males and females with mastery-responses emphasized effort
significantly more than ability, ps < .01. Females with helpless orientations differed in
their percentage weightings only marginally, t(14) = 1.888, p = .080. All other effects of
gender or task order with math anxiety, academic attitudes, or math ability were nonsignificant, ps > .10.

Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 did not fully support the proposed hypotheses.
Mainly, participants’ incremental or entity theories of intelligence did not elicit different
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patterns of studying behavior in learning a new mathematics task. Other academic
attitudes of the social-cognitive model of motivation, such as academic goals, beliefs
about effort, and attributions to failure were also not influential in how many example
statements or for how long participants studied.
However, there were two important results regarding studying behavior. First,
participants with higher math ability studied more example statements. Consequently,
these participants were more likely to determine the correct modular arithmetic algorithm
and have significantly better performance on the final test. Participants with high math
ability likely recognized either their lack in understanding modular arithmetic or that
studying more examples would lead to determining the correct method for solving
modular arithmetic in a final test. Consequently, participants who were better at math
performed better on the final test and were more likely to report the correct solution
algorithm after the final test. Studying five statements on average more than low math
ability participants presumably led high math ability participants to infer the correct
algorithm. Furthermore, having better math ability and therefore greater knowledge of
mathematics may have provided them with additional conceptual tools on which to build
an inference.
The second important result was that studying behavior was moderated by gender.
Consistent with the main hypothesis, males who believed that intelligence comes from
effort studied more example statements and spent more time studying than males that
viewed intelligence more as a fixed trait. After failing an initial test in modular
arithmetic, incrementally oriented males sought to increase their modular arithmetic
abilities by exerting more effort in the study session. However, females with theories
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closer to the entity spectrum studied more than females with incremental theories. These
results tentatively support the secondary goal of this study, establishing the socialcognitive model of motivation as the framework for how negative attitudes about math
develop and influence cognitive processes in mathematics. In accordance with stereotype
threat literature, females with entity theories of intelligence and high abilities may have
felt motivated to disconfirm the stereotype regarding their gender’s abilities in math and
therefore engaged themselves more in the task to showcase their fixed high ability during
the final test (Mendoza-Denton, Kahn, & Chan, 2008). Although power was too low to
reach significance, of the entity theorists, females with high math ability studied on
average 7 more examples and for approximately 50% longer than females with low math
ability. Only the females that were confident in their superior, fixed math ability were
motivated to study as a preemptive measure against failure in a domain that may
personify their self-worth (Dweck, 1999). The relationship between the social-cognitive
model of motivation and stereotype threat will be discussed in greater detail in the
general discussion.
More evidence of stereotype threat was found in the measures of math ability
taken before or after the modular arithmetic task. Before participants were aware that
they would be learning a new math task, females and males scored similarly. Their scores
were also consistent with average math ability measurements from previous studies
(Krause, Rudig, Ashcraft, 2009; Steiner & Ashcraft, 2012). However, if females took the
math ability measure after learning the novel task, their scores significantly decreased,
whereas scores of males were identical to their measures-first counterparts. For females,
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learning a difficult new math task through failing and self-study may elicit attitudes
consistent with stereotype threat.
Males and females also differed in their attitudes within the social-cognitive
model of motivation. Females were more likely to adopt performance goals over learning
in academia and reported higher ratings of math anxiety compared to males. Females are
at greater risk of adopting performance goals in academia because they are more likely to
receive praise on their abilities and intelligence instead of demonstrations of effort
(Dweck, 1999; Gunderson et al., 2013; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Furthermore, consistent
with the relationship proposed in this study, thoughts and rumination focused on
displaying high performance should relate to higher anxiety.
This experiment is one of the first to show a relationship between math anxiety
and the social-cognitive model of motivation. Participants that reported anxiety towards
math evaluation and learning math reported academic attitudes that originate from a fixed
view of intelligence. They were more likely to pursue performance goals, view effort as
an indication of low intelligence, and attribute failure to low intelligence. These
participants were also likely to align with entity beliefs in how they assigned the
contributions of ability and effort in math intelligence (Dweck, 1999).
Hypotheses concerning the final test were tentative based on the assumption that
there would be more substantial differences in studying behavior. However, studying
across groups was mostly equivalent. Despite the amount of studying, a majority of the
participants did not infer the correct solution and resorted to heuristics when making true
and false decisions during the final test. Consequently, these participants responded false
for a majority of trials. For example, one participant responded true only three times out
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of the eighty trials; twice when y * z = x (the only occurrences of this type of
combination) and then once when y + z = x (one of three occurrences of this type of
statement). This simple heuristic and others similar to it led participants to make rapid
responses of false during small statements, therefore causing more errors when
statements were true and coincidentally faster responses when statements were correctly
false. The heuristic responses are responsible for the final test results being inconsistent
with the math cognition literature. Mainly, increasing problem difficulty did not disrupt
performance when cognitive resources were limited by math anxiety or entity related
theories of the social-cognitive model of motivation.
Although the main hypothesis was not fully supported, Experiment 1 provides
some of the first evidence that males’ approach to learning mathematics was influenced
by their implicit theory of intelligence and that math anxiety is also related to those
beliefs. Furthermore, females’ performance and behavior were influenced by an effect
similar to a stereotype threat. Recall, it is theorized that the cognitive disruptions that
impair performance in cases of anxiety and stereotype threat are attitudes from the socialcognitive model of motivation. Specifically, the ruminations consuming mental resources
are related to how task performance reflects on the individual’s intelligence, how the
amount of effort exerted reflects on the individual’s capabilities, and how failure will be
attributed to oneself and the ramifications that follow failure. The concurrence of
stereotype threat, math anxiety, and the social-cognitive model of motivation during a
difficult math-learning task suggests some shared cognitive effects. Experiment 2 was
designed to reveal the online cognitive effects of the entity related attitudes of the model.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was included to address the potential that variations of studying
could have on final test performance. When participants are allowed to control their
engagement in studying a novel mathematics task, it makes performance analyses on the
final test impractical. It cannot be known for sure if performance differences are due to
theories of intelligence or because of varied amounts of studying. This impracticality is
especially the case when the predicted group differences in final test performance mirror
the predicted group differences in studying (i.e., incremental theorists studying longer
and therefore having better performance on final test). Furthermore, the aim of this thesis
to legitimize the social-cognitive model of motivation as an integral non-cognitive factor
in mathematics cognition research relies on results demonstrating differences in final test
performance, more specifically, interactions between attitude and the demands placed on
immediate cognitive processes.
Experiment 2 introduced and taught participants how to solve modular arithmetic
statements, followed by a test of that knowledge. With this procedure, differences in
performance between participants with entity or incremental theories of intelligence are
less confounded by their differences in motivation and study habits. The procedure
teaching the participants how to correctly determine if modular arithmetic statements are
true or false was quick and simple compared to the initial and studying phases of
Experiment 1, again insuring that each participant would begin the final testing phase
with the same knowledge. Explicit instruction in Experiment 2 should also counteract the
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confound of participants relying on heuristics to make their decisions that led to
inconsistent results in Experiment 1.
Compared to participants with incremental theories of intelligence, it was
hypothesized that participants with entity theories of intelligence would have slower
latencies and make more errors in solving modular arithmetic statements that place
greater demands on working memory resources (i.e., larger statement sizes and carrying
operations). Differences in latencies and error rates between entity and incremental
theorists were predicted to be non-significant for small statements and for statements
without carry operations.

Methods

Participants
One hundred and thirty-six participants were recruited from the UNLV Subject
Pool for partial completion of class credit. Three participants were excluded from
analyses due to previous knowledge with modular arithmetic. Another three participants
were removed because of computer errors and missing data. After exclusions,
Experiment 2 had 130 participants of which 63 were male and the mean age was 20.50
(SD = 4.824).

Materials
Scales and achievement tests administered in Experiment 2 were identical to those
used in Experiment 1. Participants completed a short demographics questionnaire and the
AMAS for math anxiety. Math ability was determined from the WRAT. Academic
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attitudes were assessed using the implicit theory of intelligence measure, academic goals
measure, effort beliefs measure, and the responses to academic failure measure. Coding
and scoring of math anxiety, math ability, and academic attitudes parallel the previous
study.

Novel Math Task
Modular arithmetic was the novel math task in Experiment 2. The statements used
in this experiment were identical to the statements seen by participants in the final test of
Experiment 1. Also, presentation order of the modular arithmetic statements was identical
to the order presented in Experiment 1.
As a reminder, modular arithmetic statements were selected based on three
factors. Statements were evenly divided into true or false, borrow or non-borrow
subtraction, and small or large statement size (i.e., single or double digits). Each
participant saw ten statements from each combination of the three factors. To insure that
statements with similar numbers or responses were not presented consecutively,
statement sets were counterbalanced in a predetermined random ordered.

Procedure
Math demographics, AMAS, academic attitude measures, and the novel math task
were presented using E-Prime 2.0 experimental software (Psychology Software Tools,
Inc., Schneider et al., 2002). Presentation of the informed consent was first. The math
demographics questionnaire, the AMAS, the WRAT, the academic attitudes and
motivation measures were presented consecutively and counterbalanced across
participants. However, because the AMAS is a five-point scale and the academic attitude
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measures are six-point scales, the WRAT-3 always interceded the two measurements.
Presentation of each of the four academic attitude measures was randomized, as well as
item order within each measure. The novel math task was counterbalanced with the other
block of materials (i.e., either immediately after the informed consent or at the end of the
experiment).
The novel math task included two phases: example and test phases. The example
phase introduced modular arithmetic and the correct algorithm for determining if a
statement is true or false. The test phase was then administered to test performance
differences between entity and incremental theorists.
The example phase began with a brief explanation of modular arithmetic.
Participants were shown the format of each statement, x ≡ y (mod z), and told that
statements are either true or false. Participants were told that determining the validity of a
statement is computed using simple math processes. This slide was identical to the one
shown to participants in Experiment 1.
Following this introduction, E-prime was used to ask the participant if they had
been exposed to modular arithmetic before. If the participant answered “no”, then the
experiment continued to the example phase. If the participant responded “yes”, a follow
up question asked if they knew the process to determine if a statement is true or false. If a
participant responded “no” to the follow up question, then the experiment continued to
the example phase. If a participant instead answered “yes”, E-prime presented them with
a text box where they could type in the method for determining the validity of a modular
arithmetic statement. Participants that typed in the correct algorithm were allowed to
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finish the experiment; although, their data was removed from analysis. When the
participant was finished typing, the experiment continue to the example phase.
All participants, even the participants that correctly gave the algorithm, were
shown four examples that outline the methods and steps used to determine the validity of
a modular arithmetic statement. The first three examples were statements with numeric
values, the fourth statement was a general example using x, y, and z. Participants selfpaced themselves through the example statements. An experimenter was present during
this phase, but only to answer questions regarding the use of E-prime. The experimenters
did not give clues, hints, or any indications to the participants about modular arithmetic.
After the example phase was complete, participants saw a transition screen
instructing them to use the algorithm they just learned to solve a final set of modular
arithmetic statements. This slide also provided directions for responding true or false.
Participants responded true or false with button presses ‘e’ and ‘i’, respectively. Equal
emphasis was placed on both speed and accuracy.
Presentation of the statements in Experiment 2 was identical to the presentation
used in Experiment 1. Trials began with a 1500 ms ready prompt, followed by the
presentation of the modular arithmetic statement. On the upper portion of the screen was
the statement. Underneath the statement was text reading “Please respond True (e) or
False (i).” The statement was presented for twelve seconds or until a response was made
by the participant. After a response, the participant began the next trial. If participants did
not respond within twelve seconds, a screen was presented stating “The modular
arithmetic statement has timed-out. Please make your responses quicker.” for two
seconds. Participants did not receive immediate correct or incorrect feedback after a
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response to prevent learning during the test phase and to make the task similar to the final
test shown in Experiment 1.
Participants saw 80 modular arithmetic statements. After presentation of the
eightieth trial, participants were prompted to rate their confidence in their performance on
the final test on a scale from 0 to 8, where 0 is ‘very poorly’ and 8 is ‘very well’. This
rating assessed the participants’ self-efficacy in modular arithmetic. Participants then
received feedback on the number of statements answered correctly on the final test, “You
have seen 80 statements. You have answered __ correctly.” After the feedback,
participants were instructed to rate how “pleased” they were with their performance on a
scale from 0 to 8, where 0 is ‘very unhappy’ and 8 is ‘very pleased’. This rating assessed
the participants’ self-concept in modular arithmetic. E-prime then prompted participants
to input numerical values that complete the following equation: Math intelligence =
_____% effort + _____% ability. The experiment concluded with a debriefing explaining
the ideas and hypotheses of the study. The experiment took approximately one hour to
complete.

Results

Response Times and Error Rates from the Modular Arithmetic Tests
Response times and error rates were recorded during the final test of modular
arithmetic ability. Response times for incorrect responses were removed from analyses.
One participant responded incorrectly on all trials in one of the within-subjects
conditions, the empty cell of the analysis of variance was replaced with the mean
response time of the same math anxiety group.
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Similar to Experiment 1, because there was a 12 second cap on solving modular
arithmetic statements, no outlier analyses were performed on response time data. Final
test trials that timed out were scored as an error and the response time was removed from
analysis. In Experiment 2, 381 trials timed out. Trials with response times less than 250
ms were considered as anticipatory; response times and responses from these trials were
removed from analyses; there were 7 of these trials in Experiment 2. In total, less than
3.6% of trials were removed from analyses.

Training
The original hypothesis of Experiment 1 predicted significant differences in
studying behavior among academic attitude groups. These predicted differences would
then have confounded the ability to find the cognitive effects that academic attitudes,
math anxiety, and math ability have on modular arithmetic performance. Experiment 2
was designed to train participants on the correct solution algorithm for modular
arithmetic such that conclusions could be made about the effects attitudes have on the
cognitive processes required to solve modular arithmetic.
In the training session, participants self-paced through four step-by-step examples
on how to solve modular arithmetic statements. The first three examples were specific
numerical statements followed by a general example with x, y, and z. Participants on
average studied the examples for 97.5 seconds (SD = 35.8). Analyses of time spent
studying the examples revealed no significant differences among math anxiety groups,
between academic attitudes, or between math ability groups, ps > .05. Participants were
therefore entering the final test with similar abilities in solving modular arithmetic
statements.
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Final Test
Analyses of the final test in Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1.
Analyses of the final test were conducted using six separate multivariate 2 x 2 x 2 withinsubjects ANOVAs for each between-subjects factor: math anxiety, implicit theories of
intelligence, effort beliefs, academic goals, mastery vs. helpless responses to failure, and
math ability. Within-subjects factors were true versus false statements, small verse large
statements, and statements with or without a borrow operation. Dependent variables were
response times and error rates. All main effects and interactions not mentioned were not
significant at p > .10.
Replicating results in Experiment 1, there was a significant three-way interaction
among within-subjects variables true/false, statement size, and borrow for the dependent
variable response times, F(1, 127) = 10.417, p < .01. Main effects of all three withinvariables supplement the interaction in response times. Participants were slower to solve
false statements than true statements, F(1, 127) = 103.053, p < .001. Large statements
were solved slower than small statements, F(1, 127) = 638.896, p < .001. Statements with
a borrow operation were solved slower than statements without a borrow, F(1, 127) =
469.416, p < .001. The interaction was driven by smaller yet still significant differences
among large and small statements that include a borrow operation in the true condition
(see Figure 20). There was a significant interaction between statement size and borrow
for error rates, F(1, 127) = 7.731, p < .01 (see Figure 21). Participants produced more
errors on large statements than small statements, F(1, 127) = 63.233, p < .001;
participants also made more errors on statements requiring a borrow operation, F(1, 127)
= 129.914, p < .001. Consistent with the literature, the significant interaction was driven
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by a greater occurrence of errors when statements were both large and contained a
borrow operation.
There were no main effects on both dependent variables for the between-subjects
variables math anxiety, implicit theories of intelligence, academic goals, and mastery
versus helpless responses to failure, ps > .05. There was a significant main effect of math
ability on error rates, F(1, 128)= 36.483, p < .01; participants with lower math ability
made more errors (M = .202, SE = .012) than participants with high math ability (M =
.098, SE = .012). There was also a marginally significant main effect of response time for
math ability, F(1, 128)= 2.920, p = .090. Low math ability participants were
approximately 300 ms slower to solve modular arithmetic statements than high math
ability participants (M = 4693 ms, SE = 130 ms).
There was only one significant interaction involving a between-subjects variable;
for error rates, effort beliefs of participants interacted with borrow, F(1, 128) = 4.913, p <
.028. Simple effects analyses indicated that there was no significant difference between
participants with positive or negative beliefs about effort, regardless of the presence of a
borrow operation. However, participants with positive effort beliefs suffered from a
larger increase in errors when comparing non-borrow statements to statements with a
borrow operation, an increase in error of 12.2%. Participants with negative effort beliefs
increased their errors by a smaller 8.2% when comparing non-borrow statements to
statements with a borrow operation.

Self-efficacy and Self-concept
To assess the participants’ self-efficacy for modular arithmetic, immediately after
solving the last statement in the final test, participants were prompted to rate their
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confidence in their performance on a scale from 0 to 8. They were then given feedback
on how many trials they answered correctly out of 80. To assess math self-concept, the
participants were then instructed to rate how “pleased” they were with their performance
on a scale from 0 to 8. Ratings of self-efficacy were significantly correlated with final test
accuracy, r = .611, p < .001, and self-concept, r = .451, p < .001. Similarly, self-concept
correlated significantly with final test accuracy, r = .447, p < .001. Although significant,
these correlations appear low considering the proximal time of the ratings and
presentation of final test performance. Math anxiety, academic attitudes, or math ability
may be influencing participants’ confidence in predicting their performance or
assessment of their abilities after viewing their performance.
The self-efficacy and self-concept self-ratings are contingent on the participants’
immediate performance. Outside the context of the present experiment, these ratings
provide little in terms of understanding participants’ sustainable attitudes about
mathematics. To preserve this context, ratings were converted into difference scores that
include final test accuracy. These modified dependent measures could then be used to
determine the influence that math anxiety, academic attitudes, and math ability may have
on these ratings. Pre-Feedback Judgment reveals how accurately participants can judge
their abilities by taking the scaled difference of self-efficacy ratings and final test
accuracy; a score less than 0 would indicate an underestimate of their abilities. PostFeedback Assessment is interpreted as how harshly participants assess their performance
by taking the scaled difference of self-concept ratings and final test accuracy; a score less
than 0 would indicate a more punitive approach to one’s abilities.
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All participants underestimated their abilities, t(129) = -17.189, p < .001. Final
test accuracy was underestimated on average 22.1%. Participants were also significantly
punitive in judging their performance, t(129) = -11.499, p < .001. Participants gave on
average self-concept ratings 20.3% less than their actual performance.
Math anxiety and math ability significantly interacted when analyzing prefeedback judgment, F(1,126) = 6.390, p < .05. When participants have low math anxiety,
judgments are equivalent across math ability groups (see Figure 22). When math anxiety
is high, low math ability participants underestimate their performance significantly more
than high math ability participants. The difference between low and high math anxiety
among low math ability participants is only marginally significant, F(1,126) = 2.873, p =
.093. This interaction is supplemented by a main effect of math ability, F(1,126) = 4.471,
p < .025. Participants with high math ability were significantly more accurate in their prefeedback judgment of their performance in modular arithmetic.
All other main effects and interaction with implicit theories of intelligence,
academic goals, effort beliefs, and responses to failure for pre-feedback judgment and
post-feedback assessment were non-significant, ps > .10 (see Table 9 for means and
standard errors).

Math Equations
Similar to Experiment 1, at the end of the modular arithmetic task, participants
were asked to complete a word equation by formulating the contributions that effort and
ability play into math intelligence. Of the 130 participants, 38 were excluded from these
analyses because their totals did not equal 100%. As predicted, those 38 participants
scored significantly lower on a measure of math ability (M = 28.2, SE = 0.81) than
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participants with math equation sums equaling 100% (M = 31.2, SE = 0.49), t(128) =
3.284, p < .001; participants who summed incorrectly were not significantly different on
measures of math anxiety or academic attitudes, ps > .10. Among all participants, there is
a main effect of math equation weightings; participants indicated that effort significantly
contributes more to math intelligence than ability, ps < .01.
Interactions of equation component weightings and the between-subjects factors
math anxiety, incremental theory, academic goals, effort beliefs, attributions to failure
and math ability were non-significant, ps > .10. However, despite the non-significant
interactions, one-sample t-tests on effort weightings corrected for inflated type-I error
found that the groups medium math anxious, incremental and entity theorists, learning
goals, high effort beliefs, helpless-oriented, and both levels of math ability all placed
significantly more emphasis on effort in contributing to math intelligence, ps < .025.

Gender and Task Order
Similar to the analyses in Experiment 1, gender and task order effects were
repeated for Experiment 2. There were 63 males and 67 females in Experiment 2. Task
order was again evenly split among the participants; 65 participants performed the task
after the between-subjects measures, 65 completed the measures after the modular
arithmetic task. A non-significant chi-square analysis found similar distributions of
gender by task order, p > .05.
Measures
The main effect of gender and the gender by task order interaction were nonsignificant with math anxiety, Fs < 1. However, there was a marginally significant main
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effect of task order, F(1,126) = 2.948, p = .088. Ratings of math anxiety were higher after
learning modular arithmetic (M = 23.0, SE = .79) than ratings before the task was
introduced (M = 21.1, SE = .78). Interactions and main effects of gender or task order
were non-significant for implicit theories of intelligence, academic goals, effort beliefs,
and attributions to failure, ps > .10.
For math ability, both main effects for gender and task order were significant;
F(1,126) = 5.930, p < .025, and F(1,126) = 9.388, p = .005, respectively (see Figure 23).
However, the interaction was non-significant, F < 1. Males performed significantly better
on the WRAT than females. Participants that completed the WRAT before the modular
arithmetic task scored higher than those that took the WRAT after.
Training
Gender and task order were analyzed in a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with
time spent viewing the example statements as the dependent variable. The main effect of
task order is marginally significant, F(1,126) = 3.388, p = .068. Participants that
completed the measures first viewed the example statements for less time (M = 91.9 s, SE
= 4.45 s) than participants that began with the modular arithmetic task (M = 104 s, SE =
4.50 s). Participants may have attempted to progress through the task quicker after
completing thirty to forty minutes of measures. The interaction of task order and gender,
the main effect of gender, and all interactions of task order or gender with math anxiety,
academic attitudes, or math ability were non-significant, ps > .10. Participants were
beginning the final test of Experiment 2 with the same knowledge of modular arithmetic.
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Final Test
Analyses of final test performance were conducted similarly to Experiment 1.
Gender and task order were added as between-subjects factors in each of a multivariate 2
x 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVA. Within-subjects factors included true versus false
statements, small versus large statements, and statements with or without a borrow
operation. Dependent variables were response times and error rates. Further analyses then
combined gender and task order each with another between-subjects variable.
Gender and borrow interacted significantly for both response times and error
rates, F(1,128) = 9.806, p < .005, and F(1,128) = 13.510, p < .001, respectively. Beyond
the significant main effects of gender in which females were slower and made more
errors than males, more difficult statements with borrow operations created a greater
discrepancy in performance between the genders (see Figures 24-25).
Gender and implicit theories of intelligence were also significant for both
response times and error rates, F(1,126) = 6.595 p < .025, and F(1,128) = 5.066, p < .05,
respectively. For response times, males and females significantly differed in response
times when they were both entity theorists; responses times were statistically equivalent
between genders for incremental theorists (see Figure 26). Simple effects indicated that
incremental and entity theorists within the male and female groups were only marginally
different, p = .054, and p = .094, respectively. The reverse happened for error rates (see
Figure 27). Males and females were significantly different when they were both
incremental theorists; responses times were similar between genders for entity theorists.
However, male entity theorists committed significantly more errors than male
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incremental theorists, F(1,126) = 4.433, p < .05. There was no significant effect of theory
of intelligence on error rates within females.
There was a significant interaction between task order and borrow, F(1,128) =
6.897, p < .01. Participants that completed the task first were significantly slower across
all conditions, F(1,128) = 10.047, p < .005. For statements with a borrow operation,
participants that performed the task first were approximately another 300 ms slower than
those participants that completed the measures first (see Figure 28).
Self-efficacy and Self-concept
Pre-feedback judgment and post-feedback assessment measures described earlier
were analyzed with gender and task order variables. There was a significant main effect
of gender on pre-feedback judgment, F(1,126) = 28.427, p < .001. Females (M = -22.6,
SE = 1.31) underestimated their performance more than males (M = -12.5, SE = 1.36).
Before they viewed their accuracy, females were rating their self-efficacy on average
28.2% worse than their actual performance.
Gender and math anxiety marginally interacted in post-judgment assessment,
F(1,126) = 2.985, p = .087. Simple effects demonstrated that low math anxious females
were significantly more punitive in assessing their performance than low math anxious
males, F(1,126) = 4.092, p < .05, (see Figure 29). However, math anxiety groups did not
differ within genders and high anxiety participants were statistically equivalent across
gender, ps > .10.
Including gender in the analysis created a main effect of implicit theories of
intelligence in pre-feedback judgment, F(1,126) = 4.627, p < .05. Participants with
incremental theories of intelligence (M = -19.4, SE = 1.27) were giving lower estimates
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of their performance than entity theorists (M = -15.4, SE = 1.35). Consistent with the
social-cognitive model of motivation, participants with entity theories may be focusing
more attention on performance, therefore providing them with more accurate estimates of
their abilities.
Math Equations
Main effects and interaction involving gender and task order with any of math
anxiety, academic attitudes, or math ability measures were non-significant, ps > .10. Onesample t-tests analyses determined that only females that completed measures first placed
significantly more emphasis on effort (M = 58.2, SE = 3.69), t(18) = 2.210, p < .05.
Males, regardless of task order, were marginally significant in their emphasis in effort, ps
< .10. Females who completed the task first placed similar emphasis on effort and ability,
t(24) = 1.134, p > .10.

Discussion
Contrasted with the self-study session in Experiment 1, instructions in Experiment
2 were effective in teaching participants how to solve modular arithmetic. Only six of the
130 participants had scores on the final test within the range of chance performance; that
is, fewer than 48 statements answered correctly (the performance for these six
participants is attributed to a propensity to respond false considerably more than their
peers). The effective training led to results regarding problem difficulty that were
consistent with past research (Ashcraft & Faust, 1994; Ashcraft & Krause, 2007;
Zbrodoff & Logan, 2005). Increasing problem difficulty by either increasing the size of
the operands or by necessitating a borrow operation significantly impacted performance

72

by lengthening response times and increasing errors, with the most difficult problems
causing disruptions more than the sum of their parts.
However, the main hypotheses of Experiment 2 were not supported. Specifically,
the results did not provide evidence that participants with entity theories of intelligence or
related attitudes within the social-cognitive model of motivation had fewer available
cognitive resources. Believing intelligence to be a fixed trait, pursuing or avoiding
displays of performance, viewing effort as an indication of low ability, and retreating
from failure did not consume enough mental resources to cause compounding decreases
in performance when statements were more difficult to solve. Furthermore, inconsistent
with past research, participants with high math anxiety performed similarly to
participants with low math anxiety. Past research has suggested that math anxiety
consumes cognitive resources, thus impairing learning and disrupting performance on
problems with higher cognitive load (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Beilock & Carr, 2005;
Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004). It was the goal of this thesis to replicate the math
anxiety effect and additionally demonstrate the same effect with entity theories of
intelligence. Explanations for this null effect and its impact on the theories will be
discussed in more detail in the General Discussion.
Consistent with the results of Experiment 1, math ability was a prominent
predictor in determining performance for Experiment 2. Participants that are better at
math are more efficient in terms of response times and error rates than low math ability
participants. The advantage in the academic setting is profound because participants
entering a class containing new math concepts can apply new techniques with greater
proficiency minutes after instruction. Additionally, participants with high math ability
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were more adept at assessing their performance in a self-efficacy rating before viewing
their final test feedback, especially if they were also high math anxious. Consistent with
the predicted relationship among math anxiety and the social-cognitive model of
motivation, participants with high anxiety and high math ability focus more on their
performance, therefore providing better estimates of their abilities. Participants with both
high math anxiety and low math ability disengage themselves from the domain and
considerably underestimate their performance.
The social-cognitive model of motivation explains the task performance of males.
Males with entity theories resembled the speed-accuracy trade-off found among high
math anxious participants in the literature: statements were solved more quickly and, as a
result, there were more errors (Faust, Ashcraft, & Fleck, 1996). Thoughts and attitudes
focused on intelligence as a fixed trait may be consuming cognitive resources that should
instead be delegated towards completing the math task. Results from the final test suggest
that females had fewer cognitive resources to effectively solve more difficult statements.
Yet, these disruptions were not caused by math anxiety or attitudes related to the socialcognitive model of motivation. Females with entity theories performed as well as females
with incremental theories of intelligence. Another affective component not measured in
the experiment was consuming limited cognitive resources in females but not males.
Results suggest that the task may have created another stereotype threat like effect
in females, whereas males were performing as predicted by the literature. In addition to
poor task performance, females scored considerably worse on the measure of math
ability, were less confident in their task performance before they viewed their feedback,
and judged their performance more harshly. However, contrasted with Experiment 1, the
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modular arithmetic task here did not provide a scenario of failure that may have led to an
effect analogous to a stereotype threat. Learning a new math task in itself, regardless of
failure, may be enough to elicit negative attitudes towards math, which disrupt learning
and performance. More research is necessary to isolate the mechanisms that may be
creating these disruptions and if those mechanisms are rooted in the social-cognitive
model of motivation.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study examined the relationship between the social-cognitive model of
motivation and math anxiety by exposing participants to a novel math task. The goal of
Experiment 1 was to show that implicit theories of intelligence and related attitudes along
the spectrum could predict and explain participant’s behavior during a mathematics task
in a laboratory setting. The goal of Experiment 2 was to demonstrate that implicit
theories of intelligence and the related academic attitudes explain local, online cognitive
deficits during a mathematics test. It was also hypothesized that the cognitive effects of
those attitudes would relate to the well-established cognitive effects of math anxiety and
stereotype threat. In predicting behavior, explaining cognitive deficits, and relating to
recognized math cognition theories, the social-cognitive model of motivation could begin
to establish itself as the framework from which attitudes about math lead to mathematical
understanding.
However, the results from this thesis only found marginal support for the model’s
theorized role. Attitudes from the model did not influence participants’ behavior or
performance when learning a new math task. Math anxiety was also insufficient in
explaining learning or performance. Differences between males and females proved
essential in understanding how the social-cognitive model of motivation explains
participants’ behavior in the novel tasks. Behavior of males characterized the predicted
effects; those with incremental theories were more engaged in the task. In contrast,
females appeared to undergo an effect similar to a stereotype threat. Finally, math ability
was the most significant factor in predicting outcomes in math tasks. Participants with
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high math ability were able to learn new math tasks more effectively and perform math
algorithms with greater efficiency.
As discussed, results did not always follow the predicted outcomes. However,
patterns in the observations suggest possible explanations for the data. For example, an
important part of Experiment 1 was activating the relevant attitudes of the socialcognitive model of motivation. Much of the research examining the model relies on
instances of failure or struggle to highlight incremental or entity related behaviors
(Blackwell et al., 2007; Hong et al., 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). It is possible that
chance performance on the initial test was not satisfactory in triggering attitudes related
to implicit theories of intelligence. Although chance performance is technically failing,
incrementally oriented participants may have felt correctly answering five out of ten
statements on a math task they have never seen before did not require an urgent need for
rigorous study; or more simply, chance performance was satisfactory performance for an
inconsequential psychology experiment.
Results suggest that failing the initial test was sufficient in triggering the predicted
effort and withdrawal behaviors of males. However, for females, failing the initial test
appears to have instead created an effect similar to a stereotype threat. Replicating the
results of standard stereotype threat scenarios (Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007;
Good, Aronson, & Harder, 2008; Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005), females performed
poorly on the math ability assessment only if they completed it after completing the
difficult math task. Furthermore, if failing the initial test elicited perceptions related to
stereotype threat, then females may have had fewer cognitive resources to teach
themselves the correct solution algorithm. Although math ability predicted if a participant
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determined the correct method, high math ability females were just as unlikely to
determine the algorithm as low math ability females. However, high math ability males
were likely to infer the solution; 14 of the 22 participants that determined the method
were males with high math ability. Females with entity theories of intelligence and high
math ability studied the most examples for the longest time; however, they could not
integrate their superior math knowledge in to learning the new task because their
cognitive resources were consumed by the stereotype threat.
Interestingly, Experiment 2 did not expose participants to a scenario of failure and
females still scored lower on the assessment of math ability, performed poorer on the
modular arithmetic task, and were considerably less confident in their abilities. It is
possible that convenient sampling provided a group of females who were by chance less
skilled in mathematics. However, examining the data further suggests that the gender
difference in math ability is actually from males performing better than average (Steiner
& Ashcraft, 2012). Additionally, female performance during the final test was influenced
by problem difficulty more than males, suggesting disruptive cognitive resources
unrelated to baseline math ability. Learning a new math task may activate the threat by
creating the possibility of failure, as demonstrated in females’ pre-feedback judgment of
their performance.
A crucial difference with the experiments in this thesis and previous studies
within the math cognition literature is that the final tests did not contain trial-to-trial
feedback. Without this feedback, negative attitudes about math may not have been
provoked enough to disrupt cognitive processing. Accordingly, attitudes regarding entity
theories of intelligence, performance goals, negative effort beliefs, and helpless responses
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to failure may have failed to surface and disrupt cognitive processes susceptible to
increased problem difficulty. However, for the purposes of Experiments 1 and 2,
eliminating feedback was important to prevent the confound of learning during the final
test. Although the experiments were different enough to prevent direct comparisons in
performance, results from both suggest that participants with varying attitudes within the
social-cognitive model are comparable to each other in terms of teaching themselves a
novel math task and learning a novel math task from simple instruction. Furthermore,
different sets of attitudes across the spectrum do not appear to systematically interfere
with cognitive resources engaged in the math task.
Just as the concern exists with any research using self-report surveys, this thesis is
limited by the reliability and validity of the measures used. The scales measuring the
social-cognitive model of motivation may not be appropriate in measuring attitudes that
would influence performance in the current study within a collegiate setting. The
academic attitudes in this thesis indicated that college students are more likely to
maintain incremental theories of intelligence, have positive beliefs about effort, and be
mastery-oriented in response to failure. Among participants that favored performance
goals, learning was still an essential academic goal. Similarly, all participants emphasized
effort over ability as the strongest contributor to math intelligence. The selection
processes of a university decrease the likelihood that students would favor entity theories
and the attitudes that follow; in the current study, less than 6% of students could be
classified onto the entity end of the theory of intelligence continuum. Consequently,
students are far enough along the incremental end of the continuum that changes in either
direction may not have led to quantitative differences in behavior when learning a novel
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mathematics task or measurable impacts on performance. Future studies should attempt
to recruit participants with more variability along the social-cognitive model of
motivation spectrum or by sampling outside of the college population.
Yet, regardless of the limitations of the social-cognitive model of motivation in
this thesis, the scales were internally consistent. Stronger incremental scores related to
more positive beliefs about effort, adoption of learning goals, and mastery responses to
failure. Therefore, non-significant findings within this study are less likely a result of a
failure to measure the social-cognitive model of motivation in college students and more
likely due to a lack in variability of those attitudes across the available sample.
One of the goals of this thesis was to establish a theoretical connection between
math anxiety and the social-cognitive model of motivation. However, without
manipulating either construct experimentally the results can only provide conjecture
about their relationship. Yet, as hypothesized, participants with high levels of anxiety
were more likely to favor displaying high levels of performance instead of learning,
viewed effort as an indication of low ability and low intelligence, and attributed academic
failure to low intelligence. Furthermore, participants were more likely to weigh effort
over ability as the significant contributor to math intelligence only if they were low math
anxious. The social-cognitive model of motivation may provide the definitive framework
for understanding why and when math anxiety disrupts learning and performance in
mathematics.
Further studies should continue to explore the possible relationships among the
social-cognitive model of motivation and attitudes towards mathematics, and
furthermore, the cognitive disruptions that may occur during learning and assessments of
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mathematics. Experimentally manipulating participants’ implicit theories of intelligence
may reveal the hypothesized behavioral and cognitive effects. Many studies have primed
entity or incremental theories to reveal significant behavioral outcomes (Burns & Isbell,
2007; Dweck, 1999; Murphy & Dweck, 2010). A similar manipulation in this context
may elicit different studying habits in learning modular arithmetic and also cognitive
deficits replicating the math anxiety research. Future experiments may also elicit stronger
attitudes and anxieties by providing more immediate or salient types of performance
feedback. For example, trial-to-trial feedback has been found to elicit stronger anxiety
responses (Eysenck & Calvo, 1982, Olvet & Hajcak, 2009). These responses may also
reveal significant cognitive differences in participants with entity or incremental theories
of intelligence.
More importantly, the significant gender effects found in this thesis should be
explored in greater detail. The results support the notion that females are at greater risk of
experiencing the learning and performance deficits due to, not just negative attitudes
about math, but also entity related attitudes of the social-cognitive model of motivation.
However, in this thesis, the stereotype was not explicitly aroused. Instead, the results
suggest that exposing females to failure in a math task, instructing them to learn on their
own the correct solution algorithm, or simply teaching them a novel math task was
enough to duplicate the typical performance deficits of a stereotype threat condition. This
may suggest that the cognitive mechanisms of stereotype threat may be closely related to
attitudes responsible for entity spectrum of the social-cognitive model of motivation. A
follow up study using previously established stereotype threat techniques in the same
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setting and task conditions combined with manipulating theories of intelligence may
specify the disrupting cognitive processes when learning and performing math.
In summary, this thesis did not show specific evidence establishing the socialcognitive model of motivation as the definitive framework that explains the constellation
of positive and negative attitudes affecting math performance. However, results
demonstrating clear relationships among attitudes of the model, math anxiety, and gender
suggest a productive line of research that could eventually determine how the socialcognitive model of motivation creates global and local cognitive deficits to mathematics
understanding.

82

APPENDIX A: TABLES
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Between Subjects Factors
Group Sizes
Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Low

28

47

Medium

29

45

High

35

38

Entity

40

61

Incremental

52

69

Math Anxiety

Implicit Theory

M (SD)

Median

22.5 (6.29)

22.0

4.59 (0.91)

4.63

Academic Goals
Performance

4.59 (0.96)

4.67

49

75

Learning

4.42 (0.91)

4.33

43

55

Effort Beliefs

4.72 (0.59)

4.78

Negative

44

58

Positive

48

72

Helpless

37

63

Mastery

55

67

Low

51

65

High

41

65

Attributions to Failure

Math Ability

4.96 (0.68)

30.24 (4.89)

5.00

30.0
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Table 2
Correlations of Math Anxiety, Academic Attitudes, and Math Ability
Measure
1. Math Anxiety
2. Implicit Theory

1

2

3

4

5

6

-.048

-

Academic Goals
3. Performance

.175**

.131

-

4. Learning

-.043

.211**

-.099

-

5. Effort Beliefs

-.158*

.369***

.015

.407***

6. Attribution to Failure

-.166*

.332***

-.034

.318***

.505***

7. Math Ability

-.173**

.010

-.143*

.081

-.020

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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-.001

Table 3
Initial Test Response Times and Error Rates
Response Times
(ms)
M
SE

Error Rates
M

SE

Math Anxiety
Low

3945

301

.429

.037

Medium

3975

324

.428

.034

High

4661

243

.440

.030

Entity

4250

237

.422

.027

Incremental

4209

236

.440

.027

Performance

3866

198

.402

.028

Learning

4639

267

.467

.025

Negative

4329

249

.445

.027

Positive

1576

228

.421

.027

Helpless

4417

258

.476

.029

Mastery

4099

220

.404

.025

Low

4400

221

.449

.026

High

4011

255

.412

.029

Implicit Theory

Academic Goals

Effort Beliefs

Attributions to Failure

Math Ability
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Table 4
Participant Behavior During Study Session
Total Statements
Viewed
M
SE

Total Study Time
(s)
M
SE

Math Anxiety
Low

18.0

2.00

116

16.9

Medium

17.1

1.81

96.5

14.4

High

16.2

1.56

94.1

12.7

Entity

16.8

1.69

103

14.1

Incremental

17.2

1.26

100

10.2

Performance

16.8

1.43

92.6

10.5

Learning

17.3

1.46

112

13.3

Negative

17.2

1.48

114

13.6

Positive

16.9

1.40

90.7

9.99

Helpless

17.0

1.52

109

14.5

Mastery

17.1

1.37

96.7

10.1

Low

14.6

1.36

84.4

9.82

High

20.1

1.40

123

13.7

Implicit Theory

Academic Goals

Effort Beliefs

Attributions to Failure

Math Ability
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Table 5
Difference Between Actual and Recalled Initial Test Performance
Difference Score
M

SE

Low

-0.30

0.306

Medium

-0.48

0.308

High

0.06

0.040

Entity

-0.15

0.216

Incremental

-0.27

0.174

Performance

-0.16

0.168

Learning

-0.29

0.219

Negative

-0.20

0.199

Positive

-0.23

0.186

Helpless

-0.19

0.139

Mastery

-0.24

0.208

Low

-0.26

0.173

High

-0.17

0.215

Math Anxiety

Implicit Theory

Academic Goals

Effort Beliefs

Attributions to Failure

Math Ability
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Table 6
Experiment 1: Math Equation Percentages of Effort and Ability
Effort

Ability

M

M

SE

Low

66.1

33.9

3.63

Medium

55.2

44.8

3.82

High

51.4

48.6

3.17

Entity

60.5

39.5

3.23

Incremental

53.9

46.1

2.80

Performance

55.8

44.2

2.64

Learning

58.7

41.3

3.50

Negative

54.5

45.5

3.13

Positive

59.5

40.5

2.95

Helpless

52.2

47.8

3.69

Mastery

60.0

40.0

2.58

Low

54.7

45.3

3.20

High

59.8

40.2

2.80

Math Anxiety

Implicit Theory of Intelligence

Academic Goals

Effort Beliefs

Attributions to Failure

Math Ability
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Table 7
Participant Behavior During Study Session by Gender
Total Statements Viewed

Total Study Time (s)

Males

Females

Males

Females

Low

17.6 (1.82)

17.6 (2.58)

109 (15.0)

95.0 (21.3)

High

14.7 (2.21)

17.8 (1.81)

97.1 (18.2)

100 (15.0)

Entity

13.8 (2.04)

19.8 (2.23)

88.3 (16.9)

116 (18.5)

Incremental

18.6 (1.86)

16.3 (1.87)

118 (15.3)

86.6 (15.5)

Performance

17.5 (2.16)

16.8 (1.83)

97.9 (17.8)

92.9 (15.0)

Learning

15.6 (1.83)

19.4 (2.49)

109 (15.1)

109 (20.5)

Negative

17.3 (2.08)

16.8 (2.06)

118 (17.0)

107 (16.9)

Positive

15.6 (1.90)

18.6 (2.08)

93.2 (15.5)

90.0 (17.0)

Helpless

15.4 (2.43)

18.4 (2.13)

94.2 (19.5)

123 (17.2)

Mastery

16.9 (1.72)

17.1 (2.02)

109 (13.8)

77.1 (16.3)

Math Anxiety

Implicit Theory

Academic Goals

Effort Beliefs

Attributions to Failure

Note: All means are adjusted using math ability as a covariate at the value WRAT Total = 30.11.
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Table 8
Participant Behavior During Study Session by Task Order
Total Statements Viewed

Total Study Time (s)

Task First

Measures First

Task First

Measures First

Low

16.8 (1.96)

18.8 (2.28)

106 (16.2)

103 (18.8)

High

18.3 (2.07)

15.1 (1.86)

111 (17.1)

89.6 (15.3)

Entity

16.0 (2.28)

17.0 (2.08)

102 (18.7)

99.7 (17.1)

Incremental

18.5 (1.83)

16.2 (1.97)

112 (15.0)

90.6 (16.2)

Performance

17.7 (1.99)

16.6 (1.94)

101 (16.2)

89.4 (15.8)

Learning

17.3 (2.07)

16.6 (2.15)

116 (16.9)

102 (17.5)

Negative

16.4 (2.06)

17.8 (2.06)

116 (16.8)

108 (16.8)

Positive

18.6 (1.98)

15.4 (1.97)

101 (16.2)

82.6 (16.1)

Helpless

17.0 (2.07)

17.4 (2.5)

111 (16.9)

109 (20.4)

Mastery

18.0 (1.98)

16.1 (1.75)

106 (16.1)

88.2 (14.2)

Math Anxiety

Implicit Theory

Academic Goals

Effort Beliefs

Attributions to Failure

Note: All means are adjusted using math ability as a covariate at the value WRAT Total = 30.11.
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Table 9
Pre-Feedback Judgments and Post-Feedback Assessments

Math Anxiety
Low
High
Implicit Theory of Intelligence
Entity
Incremental
Academic Goals
Performance
Learning
Effort Beliefs
Negative
Positive
Attributions to Failure
Helpless
Mastery
Math Ability
Low
High

Pre-Feedback
Judgment

Post-Feedback
Assessment

-16.9 (1.29)
-18.6 (1.67)

-16.2 (1.75)
-16.4 (2.33)

-15.9 (1.46)
-19.1 (1.43)

-15.3 (2.03)
-17.1 (1.98)

-17.3 (1.41)
-18.1 (1.50)

-15.4 (2.10
-17.4 (1.74)

-17.4 (1.50)
-17.8 (1.41)

-16.4 (2.10)
-16.1 (1.92)

-18.2 (1.51)
-17.1 (1.41)

-15.8 (2.07)
-16.7 (1.95)

-20.1 (1.46)
-15.3 (1.40)

-16.7 (2.14)
-15.9 (1.86)
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES
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Figure 1: Response times during the final test in Experiment 1 for all three withinsubjects variables true/false, statement size, and borrow. Error bars represent standard
errors. Points are offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 2: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 1 for all within-subjects variables
true/false, statement size, and borrow. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are
offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 3: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 1 of math anxiety by statement
size. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make error bars
more visible.
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Figure 4: Response times during the final test in Experiment 1 of academic goals,
true/false, and borrow. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally
to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 5: Response times during the final test in Experiment 1 of math ability and
true/false. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make
error bars more visible.
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Figure 6: Response times during the final test in Experiment 1 of math ability and
statement size. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make
error bars more visible.
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Figure 7: Response times during the final test in Experiment 1 of math ability and
borrow. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make error
bars more visible.
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Figure 8: Response times during the final test in Experiment 1 of participants using
algorithms or heuristics, with the variables statement size and borrow. Error bars
represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 9: Weightings of ability and effort in the equation “Math intelligence = _____%
effort + _____% ability” by math anxiety Group in Experiment 1. Dashed line at 50
represents equal weightings of ability and effort. Error bars represent standard errors.
Points are offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 10: Measure of math ability in Experiment 1 of males and females taken either
before or after the modular arithmetic task. Error bars represent standard errors. Points
are offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 11: Number of example statements studied in Experiment 1 of males and females
by entity and incremental theories of intelligence. Means are adjusted using total score on
the WRAT as a covariate. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset
horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 12: Seconds spent studying in Experiment 1 of males and females by entity and
incremental theories of intelligence. Means are adjusted using total score on the WRAT
as a covariate. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make
error bars more visible.
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Figure 13: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 1 for all three within-subjects
variables true/false, statement size, and borrow. Error bars represent standard errors.
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Figure 14: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 1 for gender, statement size, and
borrow within the false condition. Solid lines signify small statements, dashed lines
signify large statements. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset
horizontally ro make error bars more visible.
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Figure 15: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 1 for gender, statement size, and
borrow within the true condition. Solid lines signify small statements, dashed lines
signify large statements. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset
horizontally ro make error bars more visible.
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Figure 16: Response times during the final test in Experiment 1 for gender and withinsubjects variables statement size and borrow. Solid lines signify small statements, dashed
lines signify large statements. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset
horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 17: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 1 for gender and math ability.
Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make error bars
more visible.
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Figure 18: Weightings of ability and effort in the equation “Math intelligence = _____%
effort + _____% ability” by gender and task order in Experiment 1. Dashed line at 50
represents equal weightings of ability and effort. Error bars represent standard errors.
Points are offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.

109

80
Males - Mastery
75

Males - Helpless

70

Females - Mastery
Females - Helpless

65

Percentage Weightings

60
55
50

0.5	
  

0.7	
  

0.9	
  

1.1	
  

1.3	
  

1.5	
  

1.7	
  

1.9	
  

2.1	
  

2.3	
  

2.5	
  

45
40
35
30
25
20

Ability

Effort
Math Equation Inputs

Figure 19: Weightings of ability and effort in the equation “Math intelligence = _____%
effort + _____% ability” by gender and attributions to academic failure in Experiment 1.
Dashed line at 50 represents equal weightings of ability and effort. Error bars represent
standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 20: Response times during the final test in Experiment 2 for all three withinsubjects variables true/false, statement size, and borrow. Error bars represent standard
errors.

111

0.4
False - No Borrow
False - Borrow

0.35

True - No Borrow
True - Borrow

0.3

Error Rates

0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0

Small

Large
Statement Size

Figure 21: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 2 for all three within-subjects
variables true/false, statement size, and borrow. Error bars represent standard errors.
Points are offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 22: Participants’ underestimates of their final test performance by math ability and
math anxiety in Experiment 2. Zero represents accurately predicting their accuracy. Error
bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make error bars more
visible.
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Figure 23: Measure of math ability in Experiment 2 of males and females taken either
before or after the modular arithmetic task. Error bars represent standard errors. Points
are offset horizontally to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 24: Response times during the final test in Experiment 2 for gender and borrow.
Error bars represent standard errors.

115

0.5
Male
Female

Error Rates

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

No Borrow

Borrow
Borrow Operation

Figure 25: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 2 for gender and borrow. Error
bars represent standard errors.
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Figure 26: Response times during the final test in Experiment 2 for gender and implicit
theory of intelligence. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally
to make error bars more visible.
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Figure 27: Error rates during the final test in Experiment 2 for gender and implicit theory
of intelligence. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make
error bars more visible.
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Figure 28: Response times during the final test in Experiment 2 for task order and
borrow. Error bars represent standard errors.
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Figure 29: Participants’ assessments of their final test performance by gender and math
anxiety in Experiment 2. Negative values signify being less pleased than actual
performance. Error bars represent standard errors. Points are offset horizontally to make
error bars more visible.
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